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VIVIAN GROSSWALD CURRAN*

Gobalization, Legal Transnationalization and Crimes
Against Humanity: The Lipietz Case
Decided in June, 2006, the Lipietz case marks the unofficial entry
into the French legal system of a tort action for complicity in crimes
against humanity. It both departsfrom prior,establishedFrench law
and reflects numerous mechanisms by which national law is transnationalizing. The case illustrates visible, invisible, substantive and
methodological changes that globalization is producing as law's
transnationalizationchanges national law. It also suggests some of
the difficulties national legal systems face as their transnationalization produces legal change at a rate that outpaces the national capacity for efficient adaptation. The challenges illustrated by Lipietz,
characteristicof globalization,include identifying the presence and effects of legal transnationalization,as well as developing needed adaptations without undermining fundamental national legal values.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In June, 2006, a French court reached a landmark decision that
for the first time directly held the current French government liable
under tort law for acts committed by the war-time French collaborationist government in connection with crimes against humanity.' The
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. Unless otherwise noted, translations are mine. I dedicate this article to the memory of Georges Lipietz and to his
family. Sincerest thanks for comments on a previous draft to Matthias Reimann and
Me R16mi Rouquette; also to Me Rouquette for providing ongoing detailed information
concerning the Lipietz litigation; Linda Tashbook for her outstanding and dedicated
assistance; Liza Hall, my excellent research assistant; and to my dean, Mary
Crossley, for a summer grant to support the writing of this article.
1. M. A. et consorts Lipietz ci Prdfet de la Haute-Garonneet Socidtg nationaledes
chemins de fer franqais,No. 0104248, Tribunal administratif de Toulouse, 6 juin 2006,
available at http://www.ta-toulouse.juradm.fr/ta/toulouse/index ta ac.shtrml (last
visited July 21, 2006) [hereinafter Lipietz Decision]. An English translation by Anne
Witt, as revised by Vivian Grosswald Curran, available at http:/www.acaccia.fr/TheJudgment-Lipietz-in-English.html. The government did not appeal the decision, but
the court's holding was challenged by the second defendant, the national railway system. On Mar. 27, 2007, the Administrative Court of Appeals of Bordeaux, in a scantily
reasoned and very short decision, reversed, holding that the railway system had acted
under orders either from Nazi Germany or from the Vichy French government of
1940-44 [hereinafter Bordeaux Decision] (a copy of the decision is on file with the
author). Plaintiffs appealed the Bordeaux decision to the highest court, the Conseil
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Administrative Court of Toulouse awarded plaintiffs damages in a
civil suit against both the government and the national railway system, the Socitd nationale des chemins de fers franqais, more commonly known by its acronym, the SNCF. 2 The plaintiffs had initiated
a tort action for compensation because they were foreclosed from initiating a criminal action as "civil parties" ("parties civiles")3 due to
the fact that they were unable to identify any individuals as defend4
ants who personally had committed the crimes.
The plaintiffs were two cousins who had been imprisoned in Toulouse by French police in 1944 pursuant to anti-Semitic statutes enacted by the French war-time government known as "Vichy." 5 The
SNCF had transported them in horrific conditions from Toulouse to
the internment camp of Drancy, located near Paris. 6 They were liberated from Drancy after enduring months in the camp under desperate circumstances, in constant expectation of imminent deportation
7
and death.
The Lipietz case has been highly controversial in France. The
plaintiffs have been criticized bitterly and widely, among others, as
having demeaned historically important issues in an allegedly greedy
quest for monetary damages, and for bringing a legal action concerning historically important issues that was filed and managed by a
d'tat,
appeal pending. Plaintiffs' memorandum in support of their appeal is available at http://lipietz.netlspip.php?rubrique75 ("Le m~moire du pourvoi en cassation d6pos6 en Conseil d'etat par Me Alain Monod et Me Poupot," last visited July 23, 2007).
Please note that in France lawyers' submissions to court are their intellectual property and not accessible to the public without their permission. Many of the plaintiffs'
court submissions are available to the public, see id., but the French State and the
SNCF did not make theirs public. Their arguments and the evidence they adduced in
proof thereof are discussed in the Lipietz Decision, supra this note. The SNCF's arguments on appeal are discussed in the plaintiffs' submissions in defense to the SNCF's
appeal, submitted Oct. 17, 2007, available at http://lipietz.net/IMG/pdfJAppelDefenseProcesSNCF.pdf (last visited July 21, 2007). As this article goes to press, the Conseil d'Atat has ruled that the administrative court lacked jurisdiction with respect to
the SNCF. See infra note 197 and surrounding text.
2. The SNCF's name remains unchanged to date, although at the time of the
relevant events it was incorporated as a private corporation rather than as the mixed
private and public one it is today. See Lipietz Decision.
3. French law permits civil parties to join and indeed to initiate criminal actions.
See C. P~n. (Fr.), art. 85, 86.
4. Consorts Lipietz c/ ]tat et SNCF, PlaidoirieRgmi Rouquette, Tribunal adsministratifde Toulouse, at 9, availableat http://lipietz.net/spip.php?article 1856 (last
visited July 23, 2007) [hereinafter Plaidoirie];R~ponse au mtmoire SNCF du 3 avril
2006, at 4 (on file with author).
5. That government was established following the demise of the Third Republic
(1875-1940), and commonly is referred to as "Vichy" for the spa town in which it was
formed in July of 1940. On the history of Vichy, see ROBERT 0. PAXTON, VICHY
FRANck: OLD GUARD AND NEW ORDER, 1940-1944 (1972); MICHAEL R. MARRUS & ROBERT 0. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS (1981); on Vichy law, see RICHARD WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996).
6. When Georges Lipietz died in 2003, his widow and children became plaintiffs
as his successors in interest ('ayants droits'). See Lipietz Decision.
7. See id.
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plaintiffs' lawyer rather than by the state.8 Beneath criticism of the
case by the public, by members of the legal community, and by scholars may lie an unarticulated reaction resulting from globalization
and its consequence of legal transnationalization; namely, the confrontation of national law and society with a national court's indirect
and unacknowledged acceptance of principles derived from a foreign
legal culture, in this case with the Anglo-American legal concept of
tort liability for a grave human rights violation.
To view the tort action as an acceptable means for adjudicating
such grave criminal conduct in France requires departing from a
number of legal categorizations and associations rooted in a long legal tradition and in the "mentalitgs"of a specific society. 9 It requires
dissociating concepts which over time and historical developments
have come to be experienced as being indissociably connected to each
other and to tenets of fundamental justice and legitimacy.
Foreign law, that of the United States, loomed large in the case,
both as a potential threat to French national sovereignty1 ° and as the
inspiration for a form of action that not only never previously had
been accepted by a court in France, but had been rejected by French
courts explicitly from 194611 to as recently as 2002.12 In their arguments, plaintiffs raised the specter of international forum shopping
and the usurpation of French domestic issues by U.S. courts if the
Administrative Court of Toulouse were to dismiss the case. 13 Plaintiffs also introduced reasoning directly based on U.S. cases 14 as well
as on the common law rule of equitable estoppel, a legal principle
15
foreign to French national law.
Both plaintiffs and the court that ruled in their favor sought to
cast the case as a tort action properly brought in an administrative
law court, but plaintiffs also stated a claim of complicity in a crime
against humanity, and even argued that none of their tort claims was
subject to a statute of limitations. Under French law, however, only
crimes against humanity are immune from any limitations pe8. See infra, Part III.A.
9. "Mentalitds" in the sense of Philippe Arins' histoire des mentalitds, and as
adopted by the historical school of the Annales, of the fabric of a community's understandings based on its trajectory through time. See e.g., PHILIPPE ARIks, HISTOIRE DES
POPULATIONS FRANQAISES ET DE LEURS ATTITUDES DEVANT LA VIE DEPUIS LE XVIIIE SICLE (1948); GEORGES DuBY, LES TROIS ORDRES OU L'IMAGINAIRE DU F9ODALISME (1978);
Robert Mandrou, Mentalitg, in L'ENCYCLPAEDIA uNIVERSALIs (1968); JACQUES LE
GOFF, FAIRE DE L'HISTOIRE (1974).

10. See infra notes 159-161, and surrounding text.
11. See arr~t Ganascia, 14juin 1946, 116 RECUEIL DES ARRATS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT
166 (Sirey 1946).

12. See infra note 54.
13.
sponse
deaux,
14.
15.

Plaintiffs reiterated this argument, and all others discussed herein, in reto defendant SNCF's appeal to the Administrative Court of Appeal of Borappeals in France being de novo. See Bordeaux Decision, supra note 1.
See infra, notes 157-160, and surrounding text.
See infra, notes 176-179, and surrounding text.
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riod.16The argument was not necessary to plaintiffs' case, and indeed
imperiled it because French administrative law courts do not have
subject-matter jurisdiction ("compdtence") over criminal matters.
Plaintiffs made the argument for the sake of other similarly situated victims, almost all of whom would be precluded from suing
under any regime save one with no limitations period.17 This article
suggests that, far from being engaged in a quest for financial profit,
plaintiffs were bringing their action in the Anglo-American tradition
of tort suits that go against the current of law and that welcome "justice as struggle,"1 8 for the sake of the "supremacy of principle,"' 9 but
that this objective was obscured in France where, as in most civil law
countries, courts which hear tort actions are neither the best
equipped nor the best accepted fora for adjudicating issues of public
and historical importance.
The Lipietz Decision also may be seen as a case study of substantive legal changes occurring under unchanged forms of law. 20 The

case marks the sort of significant, unofficial departure from prior law
that characterizes national law's transnationalization inasmuch as it
involves a silent and unacknowledged (1) blurring of lines of demarcation between entrenched national legal categories such as public
and private law; (2) adoption of foreign legal methods; and (3) shift in
the role of the state in its relation to law, and the role of law in rela2
tion to the public. '
The following sections examine the transitions in national law
that the case illuminates. They touch on some of the difficulties that
these transitions pose for the French legal system as it creates opportunities for new methods of litigation without mechanisms, that
would permit the system to accommodate the consequences of those
changes, such as discovery, class actions, or contingency fees. Part II
will explain the historical, political, and legal events that provided
the context for the Lipietz Decision. Part III will examine traditional
legal boundaries that the decision blurred in the transnationalization
process: the private and the public, kept strictly separate in official
French legal categorizations; 2 2 the tortious and the criminal; and the
16. See infra, notes 145, and surrounding text.

17. See id.
18. JULES LOBEL,

SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG
ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA X (2003).

19. Ralph G. Steinhardt, InternationalHumanitarianLaw in the Courts of the
United States: Yamashita, Filartiga,and 911, 36 GEo. WASH. INT'L. L. REV. 1, 25
(2004).

20. See PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE
52 (2002) (using the term "transubstantiation").
21. See infra Parts III and IV.
22. I use the term "public" to denote criminal law because it is the domain of the
community, and occurs in the public space, although for reasons relating to civilian
legal systems' origins in Roman law, the criminal law courts are private law courts, a
paradox long acknowledged to be such by the French legal community. On the proper
STATE
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financial and the symbolic. Part IV will explore the motives and
mechanisms by which litigants and courts initiate legal transnationalization, and the role of globalization in the processes involved. Part
V then will discuss briefly the effects of law's transnationalization
where the national legal order is not equipped to adapt to the concomitant changes. Part VI will conclude by relating this article to the
larger objective of understanding legal transnationalization.
II.

HISTORICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

When Charles de Gaulle assumed office in 1944 after the Liberation of France, the prevailing view was that Vichy had been a Naziimposed German phenomenon, rather than a French one. This position enabled the country to reunify in peacetime rather than to accentuate the divisions that had separated collaborators from resisters
during the four years of Nazi occupation. It went hand in hand with
the decree of 1944 to the effect that Vichy never had been legitimate
and was null and void ab initio,23 a view deeply held not only by de
25
Gaulle, 24 but also endorsed by eminent legal scholars at the time.
This view also was consistent with judicial holdings that the post-war
government of France had no legal responsibility for events that had
26
occurred during the Vichy period.
As time passed, incremental interest in the war years slowly led
to increased recognition of the many French aspects of Vichy. 2 7 This
change in perspective became widespread. The post-war generation
wanted to understand France's role in the Holocaust, during which
categorization of criminal law as public law, see RENt DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRucTURE, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 116 (Michael Kindred trans., 1972). Roman law
also categorized criminal law as public, but when Roman law was transplanted into
continental Europe, there were no centralized states in Europe, so only Roman pri-

vate law was adopted. See

MARY

ANN

GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADI-

58 (2d ed., 2007) (1985); JOHN
196 (1999). Criminal law was a public law matter that needed to be part of their systems, however, and
so found itself in the court system that later was to be classified as private, in contrast
to the later public law courts which followed the strong centralized continental European states of later centuries. For a recent analysis of Roman law categorizations in
the context of modern civilian systems, see Gibor Hamza, The Classification(divisio)
Into "Branches"of Modern Legal Systems (Orders)and Roman Law Traditions,8 EUR.
TIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS AND CASES ON WESTERN LAW

HENRY MERRYMAN, THE LONELINESS OF THE COMPARATIVE LAWYER

J. L. REFORM 361 (2007).

23. Ordonnance du 9 aoiit 1944 portant rdtablissementde la ldgalit6 rdpublicaine.
For a discussion of its impact, see PHILIPPE BOURDREL, L'EPURATION SAUVAGE 1944-45
(2002); Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional
State: Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 60 (1998).
24. See CHARLES DE GAULLE, M9MOIRES DE GUERRE: L'UNITI9 1942-44, 308 (1956).
25. Most notably, Ren6 Cassin, later principal drafter of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Nobel peace laureate. See RENP CASSIN, UN COUP-D'ETAT: LA
SOI-DISANT CONSTITUTION DE VICHY (1940).

26. The most significant early post-war case was the arr&Ganascia, supra note
11.
27. This evolution was highly complex. See HENRY Rousso, THE VICHY SYNDROME:
HISTORY AND MEMORY OF FRANCE SINCE 1944 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1991).
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some 75,000 Jews had been deported from France, almost all to their
deaths, rounded up by French police for the most part.28 Another factor in France's gradually increased willingness to examine the country's past without defensiveness was that the nation had become used
to considerable self-examination and self-criticism in its post-colonial
phase as it struggled to come to terms
with the brutality of France's
29
conduct in Algeria during the 1950s.
In 1994, after what has been aptly described as "a lengthy series
of judgments and counter-judgments" 30 spanning half a century, Paul
Touvier, the French leader of a Vichy-organized paramilitary group,
called the milice, was tried and convicted for complicity in a crime
against humanity. 3 1 Even lengthier tergiversations characterized the
case of Maurice Papon, former secretary general for police in the Bordeaux area during the war, who had signed the order that had led to
the arrest, deportation to concentration camps, and death of Jews in
32
his area of southern France.
28. See id.; MARRUS & PAXTON, supra note 5; WEISBERG, supra note 5.
29. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Politicizing the Crime Against Humanity: the
FrenchExample, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677 (2003). For much-acclaimed work on the
role of France in Algeria, see PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET, LA TORTURE DANS LA R1tPUBLIQUE
(1954-62) (1998); PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET, LA RAISON D'ETAT (1962).
30. YVES BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMES AND TORTURE: FRENCH JUSTICE AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AND COMMISSIONS (1940-2005) 211 (2006).
31. The immediately previous dismissal of charges against him had been the arr~t
de la chambre d'accusationde Parisdu 13 avril 1992. Touvier originally (in 1946) had
been condemned for treason and exchanging intelligence with the enemy, and had
gone into hiding. President Pompidou pardoned him in 1971. See MICHEL WINOCK, LA
FRANCE ET LES JUIFS / 1789 A NOS ioURs (2004); Jean-Pierre Azdma, L'Aglise et
l'Affaire Touvier, 152 L'HISTOIRE 80 (1992). In 1973, former victims and their heirs
sued him for complicity in crimes against humanity, leading to an indictment and
dismissal two decades later, before the Cour de cassation overturned ("quashed") the
dismissal, which ruling was followed by a trial and conviction. See Curran, supra note

23, at 78-79.
32. See Curran, supra note 23, at 75-76. The executive branch of the government
played an important role in these matters. See id.; L'EXPRESS, Oct. 8, 1977, at 11-31.

As belated revelations about President Mitterrand's own involvement in Vichy were
to make clear, his government had had many reasons for preferring that Vichy not be
put on trial. See PIERRE P9AN, UNE JEUNESSE FRANQAISE - FRANCOIS MITTERRAND,

1934-47 (1994). Accordingly, repeated efforts to bring to justice French collaborators
responsible for thousands of deaths consistently had been thwarted up to the time of
the Touvier indictment. With respect to Rend Bousquet, Vichy's chief of police, and
Jean Leguay, who represented Bousquet in the Nazi-occupied zone, two defendants
who died before they could be tried, see Robert 0. Paxton, The Jew Hater, 53 N.Y.
REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 16, 2006, at 26-29, it was to be decades before others were tried,
their longevity thwarting the strategy that postponement might last until no defendant remained alive to be tried. Accord Curran, supra note 23, at 92-93. In the present affaire Lipietz, the plaintiffs referred to their inability to bring an action against
Cheneaux de Leyritz, the prefect of the Haute-Garonne in 1944 responsible for their
harm, inasmuch as he seemed to have disappeared and the defendant French government did not offer any information as to his possible whereabouts, if still alive. See
Rdplique sur les mdmoires transmis le 3 mars 2006 et observations compldmentaires
(filed on behalf of plaintiffs), available at http://lipietz.net/imprime.php3?idarticle=
1849 [hereinafter Roplique sur les mdmoires transmis le 3 mars 2006] (last visited
July 6, 2006). But see infra note 130.
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Both the Touvier and Papon trials received enormous press coverage, and, despite complicated court-engendered legal definitions
that immunized Vichy from responsibility for crimes against humanity committed in France during the war, headlines reported the trials'
developments as though they were the trials of the Vichy government. 33 In 1995, on the heels of the Touvier trial and public debate
about Papon, President Chirac made shock waves throughout France
in a speech to commemorate one of the most notorious round-ups of
Jews that had occurred on French soil, known as the rafle du Vel
34
d'Hiv.
In his speech, he established an explicit moral connection between contemporary France and the acts of Vichy when he referred to
"the wrongs of the past, and the wrongs committed by the state, [in]
the blackest hours of our history .

. . .,"

further specifying that "[o]n

that day [of the round-up], France committed an irreparable act...."
He thus ended what is referred to as "the Vichy parenthesis" ("la
parenthse de Vichy"), i.e., the position that Vichy was a non-French
regime lodged like a parenthetical clause between the prior Third Republic (1875-1940) and the post-Liberation Fourth Republic (19441958).
He further stated that "we continue to owe them [i.e., the deported] a timeless debt."35 His references to "France" and "the state"
made no distinction between the France of Vichy's dictator, Marshal
Pdtain, and France's Fifth Republic of which Chirac was president.
The French word Chirac used for "timeless," "imprescriptible,"is the
same word French law uses to denote an act that is not subject to any
statute of limitations. 36 It is unlikely, however, that Chirac had in
mind assuming financial responsibility for Vichy's victims. The growing acceptance that Vichy had been largely a French phenomenon
33. This can be seen in the Lexis database of French newspapers and magazines.
Libraries: World/PRESSE ("French language"); search: "Paul Touvier"; with respect
to the Papon trial, the lawyer for parties civiles said, "[T]hrough Maurice Papon, I
shall plead for the conviction of the apparatus of the State of Vichy." Proc~sPapon. La
dernireligne droite, PARIS MATCH, Mar. 19, 1998, at 65. A typical French news article
is titled "Papon: the duty of History. We [are] obliged to judge a man, an epoch, a
regime." Denis Jembar, Papon:le devoir d'Histoire - Nous revoild ... contraints de
juger un homme, une 6poque, un rdgime. L'ExPREss, Oct. 8, 1997, at 9. See also Craig
R. Whitney, Ex-Vichy Aide Is Convicted and Reaction Ranges Wide, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
3, 1997, at A-11. ("The verdict is a condemnation of Vichy.")
34. Jacques Chirac, speech of July 16, 2005: 'Allocution de M. Jacques CHIRAC,
Presidentde la Rdpublique, prononcge lors des cdrmonies commdmorant la grande
rafle des 16 et 17 juillet 1942, available at http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/francais/interventions/discours et declarations/1995/juillet/allocution de-mjacquesschirac-president de larepublique-prononcee lors des ceremoniescommemorantla grande.
rafle des16et17_juillet_1942-paris.2503.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2006).
35. See id.; Plaidoirie,supra note 4.
36. For a discussion of the term "imprescriptible,"see Curran, supra note 23, at
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did, however, begin to chip away at the post-war principle that Vichy
had not been the French government.
After Chirac's 1995 speech, the French Jewish community urged
him to address the expropriation to which Jews had been subject
under the "aryanization" laws of Vichy. 37 Legal and political events
abroad also affected this issue. By 1996, the first class action suit had
been brought in a U.S. court against Swiss banks for their refusal to
return assets to Holocaust survivors. 38 The year 1997 saw the filing
of the first U.S. class action suit against French banks for their participation in the taking of Jewish assets, 3 9 as well as the hugely publicized trial in France of Maurice Papon, mentioned above.
In the same year, Chirac decided to establish a fact-finding commission, known as the Commission Mattdoli, charged with looking
into the expropriation of Jewish-owned assets during the Vichy period, but with no powers beyond studying, evaluating, learning, and
proposing. 40 By 1999, however, two more class action suits had been
filed against French banks in the United States for the looting of
Jewish assets. The class action suits in the United States were initiated by former residents and citizens of France who had fled from
Europe in the 1930s and 1940s to escape persecution, or by their descendants. 4 1 In September of 1999, a French executive law established a commission empowered to receive and grant requests from
individuals for indemnification, known as the "CIVS."4 2 The CIVS
was established under the auspices of the Prime Minister's office
which to date continues to be in charge of overseeing the process according to rules established by the executive branch. 43
37. The principal "aryanization" laws are summarized in Appendix 4 ("Annexe 4")
in L'aryanisation 6conomique 1940-1944, in LE DROIT ANTIS9MITE DE VICHY 591-92
(Maurice Olender ed., 1996).
38. See STUART E. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR,
AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II 78 (2003).
39. Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (with which
was consolidated a similar Benisti v. Banque Paribas, 98 Civ. 7851 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 23,
1998)).
40. On the formation of the Commission Mattgoli, see Embassy of France in the
U.S.-Nov. 30th-Dec. 3rd, 1998, available at http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/
statements/1998/wchea/matteoli.asp (last visited Apr, 4, 2007). In the words of Ady
Steg, its Vice-President, "[tihe Commission's primary objective is a historical one: to
establish the truth.. . " Statement of Ady Steg of the French fact-finding mission in
charge of research on Jewish assets of the Holocaust period, to United States House of
Representatives, Washington, Sept. 14, 1999, available at http://financialservices.
house.gov/banking/91499ste.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2006). The Commission did
propose restitution measures, which led to the government's establishment of the
CIVS. See infra notes 42-43, and surrounding text.
41. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 38.
42. Dcret no. 99-778, J.O. 11 septembre 1999. "CIVS" is the acronym for the
Commission's full name: la Commission pour l'Indemnisation des Victimes de Spoliations intervenues du fait des lMgislations antisdmites en vigueur pendant l'Occupation.
Its website is at http://www.gouv.fr/information/information03.htm.
43. See id.
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In 2000, to surprise and consternation in France, the U. S. court
in Bodner v. Banque Paribaset al.,44 denied the French defendant
financial institutions' motion to dismiss. 4 5 To those in France who
had been following the class action suits, the court's decision was
wholly unexpected because U.S. courts recently had dismissed class
action suits against German companies, creating a widespread assumption that the French suits also would be dismissed. 46 An American court now was entertaining a lawsuit by former residents and
citizens of France, some of whom were not citizens of the United
States,47 and who were suing over French conduct that had occurred
in France. In addition, by 2000, the U.S. government had become involved in negotiating for Holocaust restitution of looted property from
France. 48 In 2001, this process culminated in the Washington Agreement. 4 9 The increasing globalization of markets had given the U.S.

government enormous power in negotiating for indemnification from
countries before which it raised the specter of imposing restrictions
50
on doing business in the United States.
The French executive branch's slow reversal of position soon was
followed by the judiciary's. The post-war state's financial liability for
Vichy-era conduct, long rejected by France's courts, 5 1 found its way
into the courts again as an indirect result of partie civile claims as44. See supra note 39.
45. See id.
46. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 38, at 320. At a conference on Holocaust reparations at Fordham Law School in 2001, at least one of the plaintiffs' attorneys suggested that the suits had been brought for their settlement value, and that they were
on shaky legal grounds. Holocaust Restitution: Reconciling Moral Imperatives with
legal initiativesand Diplomacy (Symposium of Nov. 1, 2001) (author was a panelist at
this symposium). Bodner, however, had a strong case against dismissal. (The present
author wrote an expert opinion for the plaintiffs in that case, available upon request.)
See also Samuel P. Baumgartner, Human Rights and Civil Litigation in United States
Courts: The Holocaust-Era Cases, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 844 (critiquing plainitffs'
legal premises and concluding that "the legal arguments ... were only of secondary
importance in the outcome of the litigation.").
47. Bodner was brought by United States citizens, while Benisti was not. The district court held that the Benisti plaintiffs had alleged a cause of action under the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (the parties subsequently settled).
48. The negotiations were conducted under the leadership of Stuart Eizenstat.

See

EIZENSTAT,

supra note 38, at 322.

49. See D6cret no. 2001-243 du 21 mars 2001. See generally, Richard M. Buxbaum, A Legal History of InternationalReparations, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L. L. 314
(2005); Yas Banifatemi, La Restitution des avoirs juifs en deshdrance sous l'angle du

droit internationalpublic, 44

ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS DE DR. INT'L

76 (1998).

50. See Banifatemi, supra note 49, at 78, n.6, 80.
51. See l'arrt Ganascia supra note 11; l'Affaire Schaechter, L']tat et la SNCF
condamnds pour leur responsabilitg dans la deportation de membres de la famille
Lipietz, A.P., YAHOO.FR, available at http://www.denistouret.netlconstit/antisemitisme.html (last visited July 19, 2007); Ddportation. Convois de dportds: l'tat
et la
SNCF condamnds par la justice administrative,available at http://www.anciencombattant.com/article.cfm?id=101812 (last visited July 19, 2007).

372

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 56

serted in Papon's criminal-law court case, although, ironically, from
52
claims asserted by Papon rather than by victims.
In accordance with French criminal law's allowing victims'
claims for civil recovery to be asserted, proved, and decided as part of
the criminal proceedings,5 3 in 1998, a criminal law court both had
convicted Papon of complicity in crimes against humanity and had
found him liable to the partie civile plaintiffs.5 4 Papon, however, then
proceeded to sue the French government in the administrative law
court system, arguing that the state should be ordered to indemnify
him for what he owed the victims. He argued that the conduct for
which he had been held liable to the partie civile plaintiffs in the
criminal proceeding had been part of the faithful execution of his duties, since at all relevant times he had been acting within the scope of
his state employment in the police. 5 5 The highest administrative law
court of France, the Conseil d'Atat (also the court of last resort to
which the Lipietz case is under appeal as of this writing with respect
to defendant SNCF), agreed with Papon's reasoning. Accordingly, in
2002, the Court ordered the state to pay half of the amount for which
Papon had been found liable to the victims, finding that he remained
personally liable for the other half for acts he had not been obliged to
56
commit as part of his job.
The Court referred to the Vichy government and the current
Fifth Republic simply as "the French administration"
("'administrationfranqaise"), making no distinction between the government of Vichy and the government of the post-war French state.5 7
In Papon, the highest administrative law court, rather than criminal
law court, thus took the step to create the legal continuity between
the current Fifth Republic and the Vichy government that President
Chirac had signaled in his speech as being an ethical responsibility,
but which had not been espoused by a French court as a legal responsibility.5 8 These were the historical, legal and political influences
that provided the backdrop for the Lipietz Decision.
52. Verdict of the Cour d'assisesde la Gironde of April 8, 1998. See also infra note
54.
53. See supra note 3.
54. This verdict of the Cour d'assises de la Gironde of Apr. 8, 1998 followed a
detailed decision by the supreme court (Cour de cassation)which had relaxed the judicially created strictures against convicting Vichy collaborators of crimes against humanity. See Cass. Crim. Jan. 23, 1997. For an analysis thereof, see LA SEMAINE
JURIDIQUE, No. 14, Apr. 2, 1997; and Curran, supra note 23, at 73-94.
55. See M. Papon, Conseil d'etat no. 238689, Apr. 12, 2002, available at http:/!
www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/jurispd/index acIdO2O5.shtml (last visited July 23, 2007).
56. The total damages awarded to plaintiffs in the criminal proceedings
amounted to 719, 559. The State had to indemnify Papon in the amount of 472, 000.
Id.
57. Id.
58. A year before the Papon holding, the Conseil d']Ptat in Pelletierhad upheld an
executive law (a "ddcret") that had awarded compensation to children of deportees
who had become orphaned due to their parents' death in deportation. This decision
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III.
A.

BLURRED BOUNDARIES

Criticism of the Lipietz Decision and Plaintiffs59

Lawyers, historians, politicians, and even organizations such as
the Sons and Daughters of the Deported opposed the suit vehemently.60 One might wonder if the discomfiting nature of the Lipietz
Decision for the general public and legal community arose from the
court's having been the first to hold the French state directly liable
for acts of the Vichy government. The high administrative law court's
ruling in Papon had been somewhat buried in an appeal for indemnification for Papon's criminal acts, i.e., proceeding from a criminal, not
tort, law action, and one which had been brought against him individually, rather than directly against the current French government.
On the other hand, it was the Papon case, not the Lipietz Decision, that effected the substantive revolution from legal non-responsibility to legal responsibility between the current Fifth Republic and
Vichy and, moreover, in a decision that had not been highly controversial. Substantively, the Lipietz Decision at most marked the final
was not a departure from the holding in Ganascia,inasmuch as the court had maintained in Ganasciathat it could only award damages if legislation so provided. On the
other hand, in that case, Pelletier, the court had suggested that the current government would, in an appropriate case, be responsible for acts of the Vichy regime. See
M. Pelletier et autres, Conseil d'Ptat, no. 224945, Apr. 6, 2001, available at http://
www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/jurispd/index-acId0155.shtml (last visited July 23, 2007).
59. Absent from this analysis because beyond the scope of this article is a topic I
have discussed at some length elsewhere: namely, problems inherent in trials and
judicial resolutions of Holocaust-related issues. See Curran, supra note 23, at 73-94;
Vivian Grosswald Curran, Atoms of the Law: book review of Lawrence Douglas,
Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust, 53 TORONTO L. J. 305 (2003). I
am grateful to Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty for suggesting that research into
traditional Chinese approaches may be productive in considering alternatives to the
juridification of Holocaust-related issues. See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY & PIERREETIENNE WILL, LA CHINE ET LA D9MOCRATIE (2007).
60. See, e.g., Arno Klarsfeld, La SNCF et les trains de la mort, LE MONDE (PARIS),
June 3, 2006 (lawyers); Pierre-Frangois Veil & Patrick Klugman, La requite de ces
200 familles nous plonge dans une re malsaine LE FiGARo, Sept. 28, 2006; Annette
Wieviorka, La SNCF, la Shoah et le juge, 316 HISTOiRE 89 (2007); Henry Rousso,
quoted in Sophie Bouniot, La SNCF attaquge pour son r6le dans la ddportation,
L'HUMANIT, Aug. 31, 2006, available at http://www.humanite.fr/2006-08-31_SocieteLa-SNCF-attaque-pour-son-role-dans-la-deportation (last visited July 26, 2007);
Guylain Chevrier, Condamnationde l',tatet de la SNCF pour leur r~le dans la dportation de juifs: un contresens historique et un pdril pour la mdmoire, June 14, 2006,
available at http://www.ufal.29.infini.fr/article.php?id-article=562 (last visited July
24, 2007) (historians); Robert Badinter, interview with Roland Sicard, T6lmation
(television program on "France 2" channel), Mar. 21, 2007 (former Minister of Justice); e-mail statement to attorney for Lipietz plaintiffs by Sons and Daughters of the
Deported (on file with author, forwarded by Me Rouquette). It should be noted that
the President of this organization, Serge Klarsfeld, is the father of Arno Klarsfeld,
attorney representing the SNCF in New York. Jewish groups are of mixed reaction.
See, e.g., letter of Dec. 13, 2006, by the Coordination of the Jewish Children of France
Who Survived the Shoah (letter of protest to Annette Wievorka, supra, for deriding
their claim to compensatory damages for injuries their deported parents suffered),
available at http://lipietz.net/spip.php?articlel967 (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
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dotting of the i or crossing of the t that the affaire Papon logically
required in terms of present-day government liability for acts connected to crimes committed under the Vichy regime.
The Lipietz Decision, however, unlike the Conseil d'Etat's decision in Papon, provoked a considerable number of negative articles on
the case in the mainstream French media. Lawyers' opinion pieces
tended to be strongly critical of the court and the plaintiffs. 6 1 The
legal establishment also demonstrated hostility by the relative si62
lence of legal journals about this otherwise highly publicized case.
In particular, the commissaire du gouvernement found the doors
of legal publishers closed to him. The commissaire du gouvernement
is a French government official whose function is approximately that
of an Advocate General in the European Court of Justice, 6 3 providing
the court with a thoroughly reasoned proposed decision before the
court deliberates. As often is the case, the Administrative Court of
Toulouse adopted almost all of the commissaire's opinion ("Conclusions").6 4 Despite the great amount of attention the case had received, which one would have supposed to ensure that the
commissaire's opinion and commentary would be published eagerly,
French legal publications declined to print it.65
An article that expressed many of the criticisms voiced in France
of the Lipietz plaintiffs and court decision, emphasized (1) the (for
66
France) high amount of damages the court awarded the plaintiffs;
(2) that original plaintiff Georges Lipietz had died before the end of
61. See, e.g., Veil & Klugman, supra note 60 (both litigators) (characterizing
Lipietz as a "fatal/disastrous decision," harbinger of an era no longer dedicated to
memory but to profit ["l'heure n'estplus & la mdmoire mais aux affaires"]); Arno Klarsfeld (also a litigator), La SNCF et les trains de la mort, LE MONDE (PARis), June 3,
2006 (arguing that plaintiffs' claims sullied the memory of the SNCF employees who
resisted the Germans); Deux prdcddents, LIBtRATION (Paris), June 7, 2006, at 6 (contrasting the number of SNCF employees executed for resistance with the smaller
number censured for collaboration, but omitting reference to plaintiffs' own emphasis
on culpability of SNCF management towards both the deported and its own employees who resisted the Germans). But see Jordan Pillet, La SNCF rattrapde par les
trains de la mort, 9 CULTURE DROIT 14 (Sept.-Oct. 2006) (expos6 of the victims' perspective in an interview with two lawyers for post-Lipietz plaintiffs).
et de la
62. An exception is Jean-Charles Jobart, Les responsabilits de l'tat
SNCFdans la ddportation des Juifs ou des rapports du droit, du temps et de l'histoire,
6 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 1716 (2006). Compare Dgportationdejuifs en 1944: la CAA
de Bordeaux annule la condamnation de la SNCF, 14 JCP 14, Apr. 14, 2007, at 10
(prominent French legal periodical summarizes appellate court's reversal of Lipietz
Decision with respect to defendant SNCF).
63. The French commissaire du gouvernement was the model the E.U. adopted for
the Advocate General. See, e.g., GEORGE A. BERMANN et al., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 61
(2d ed. 2002), and sources cited therein.
64. His opinion is available at http://www.ta-toulouse.juradm.fr/ta/toulouse/
pdffdoc/conclusions ta toulouse_0104248.pdf (last visited July 27, 2007).
65. The commissaire du gouvernement, M. Truilh6, communicated this in an inquiry as to whether I thought it might be published in a United States legal journal.
(E-mail on file with author.)
66. Wieviorka, supra note 60.
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the trial, such that his widow and children would become the actual
recipients of the money, although they personally had suffered
neither denunciation to the Gestapo, nor arrest in Toulouse, nor
transport by the SNCF in cattle cars without food, water, or hygiene,
nor internment in Drancy; 6 7 (3) the unacceptable implication of this
case that compensation in the form of money can be assigned to
human misery;68 (4) that the trial had been too rapid and the judgment reached too hastily, in contrast to the criminal trial of Papon,
which had lasted many months; 69 (5) that the plaintiffs' lawyer was
interested only in making legal arguments that ultimately would succeed, not in tackling the complex historical problems which the case
involved, and that he was, as a privately hired advocate, not even
obliged to do so;70 and (6) that the lawsuit trivialized the guilt of Nazi
Germany by assigning legal responsibility to the French state for acts
committed when it had been conquered and was being occupied by
the Germans; and to the SNCF, when it too had been under the
71
thumb of the Nazis.
The expressed criticism of the Lipietz plaintiffs and decision left
unexpressed the role of globalization as a causal factor in the distress. When considered more closely, however, the negative reaction
may relate to the shift to a common law style tort action. It also may
reflect distress about a hallmark of globalization: i.e., that it causes
"even internally within nation-states the distinction between public
and private interests to lose . . . relevance, and the management of

public interests no longer to be the monopoly of the state."72 In this
regard, the suit's adjudication in a forum other than a criminal law
court was an instantiation of a fading of relevance in the distinction
between public and private interests.

67. Id. A group of Jewish children of the deported responded to this argument by
calling into question her statement that it was "indecent" for those who did not suffer
directly at the hands of the Nazis to be indemnified in the place of their deported
parents. Letter of Dec. 13, 2006 of La Coordination des enfants de juifs de France
survivants de la Shoah, available at http://lipietz.net/spip.php?article 1967 (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). Significantly, in contrast to the well-known journal which published Professor Wieviorka's article, the Jewish organization's letter was posted on
the internet by Alain Lipietz, successor in interest to Georges Lipietz, but to my
knowledge it has not been published elsewhere.
68. Wieviorka, supra note 60.
69. Id. at 91.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 95-99. The SNCF had enjoyed a reputation for resistance due to the
many SNCF employees who had been engaged in courageous war-time activities, with
close to 2,000 having been shot by the Germans or deported to their deaths in concentration camps.
72. JEAN-MARIE GULHENNO, L'AvENR DE LA LIBERT9. LA DAMOCRATIE DANS LA
MONDIALISATION 18 (1999).
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Criminal Proceedings in French Politicaland Legal Culture

The French criminal trial places the actors on a much different
footing from its common law counterpart. Above all, in France the
judges are the major players at the criminal trial, 73 with all relevant
facts generally having been conceded before the oral phase of the
74
trial, such that the latter is not the locus of fact determination.
Moreover, they specialize solely in criminal cases and play a role in
French law that is far more didactic than that of judges sitting in
non-criminal cases.
The particular nature of the "triangular relationship among the
public authority, the defendant and the partie civile victim" 75 in the
criminal law trial is key to the conclusion of Professor Yves Strickler
of the University of Strasbourg that crime victims should be addressing claims for financial redress to criminal court judges only.7 6 Traditionally, the victim's being part of a criminal prosecution has been
particularly vital because the issues in French criminal law are not
exclusively legal in nature. As Rend David put it, "a Frenchman
knows that it [i.e., criminal law] is not and cannot be law in the strict
77
sense."
The criminal trial legitimately is part of a political statement: "A
Frenchman will allow the government a degree of. . . even arbitrariness, that is hard to reconcile with the certainty characteristic of legal principles."78 Recently, in an empirical study of over 120 French
criminal trials, Professor Stewart Field has noted the crucial role of
French political culture to the function that the criminal trial plays in
today's society. 79 It is a role which occupies a unique position in the
French legal system. The criminal trial is not limited to resolving the
charges against the defendant. Rather, the judge has great latitude
to bring in any matter that might recreate the past and shed some
light on events only indirectly related to the matters at hand, and
particularly aspects that might shed light on the moral character and
psychological outlook of the perpetrator within the context in which
he or she acted.80
Had the Lipietz case been brought in criminal court, the trial
would have unfolded differently in the following ways: a judge would
73. See, e.g., ANToINE GARAPON & IOANNIS PAPADOPOULOS, JUGER EN AM9RIQUE ET
EN FRANCE 107 (2003).

74. Id. at 113; John Leubsdorf, On the History of FrenchLegal Ethics, 8 U. CH. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 341 (2001).

75. Yves Strickler, Apr~s la crise de l'Affaire d'Outreau: l'motion et la procedure
p~nale, 249 PETITES AFFICHES 7, 10 (Dec. 14, 2006).
76. See id.
77. DAVID, supra note 22, at 119.

78. Id. at 120.
79. See Stewart Field, State, Citizen, and Characterin the French CriminalProcess, 33 J. L. & Soc'Y. 522, 527 (2006).
80. Id.
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have presided whose task would have been to "build interpretations
of meanings and explanations"8 l constructed from extensive investigation. These interpretations would have been aired in public during
the final, oral phase of the process, with the presiding judge offering
extensive commentary relevant to how the public should interpret
the events. In other words, French and many other continental European judges presiding in criminal cases are in charge of a symbolic
process that involves conveying a social message.8 2 Moreover, the
presiding judge of the French criminal trial is the voice of the state, a
"republican monarch," 3 charged with formulating and conveying the
state's view of the matters adjudicated. Thus, in Lipietz, this central
role of the French state in formulating national positions and transmitting them through the criminal court trial process was entirely
usurped.
When the Lipietz decision was criticized for having been adjudicated too rapidly, unlike the criminal trial of Maurice Papon,8 4 the
critique could not really have been referring to the time of adjudication, since it had taken over five years from the suit's filing in 1994
for the Administrative Court of Toulouse to reach its decision. The
difference is not that French civil or administrative court trials are
shorter than criminal trials, but that non-criminal court trials take
place virtually entirely in writing, through various written submissions, with an ultimate, public, oral phase consisting of just one short
hearing during which no witnesses are heard. Not even the parties'
briefs are in the public domain, since in France they are the intellectual property of their author and thus subject to copyright protection.8 5 By contrast, criminal trials, especially in highly publicized and
politically sensitive cases, can involve an extensive oral phase, and
include witnesses.8 6 Thus, as a case not tried in criminal court,
Lipietz was conducted in writing, with only a final oral hearing consisting of statements by the attorneys. As a result, there was no public airing of the issues involving national historical memory and
ethics.
Further, prosecutors in France and many other civilian countries
are magistrates who justifiably are considered to be far more neutral
81. Id. at 522.
82. See id. at 535.
83. Id. at 540, citing P. Le Quinquis, Le Prdsident de la Cour d'assises, 10 REV.
GAN. DR. PROCESSUEL 99, 100 (1998).
84. See supra note 60. See also Coralie Ambroise-Cast6rot, Le Proc s pdnal, entre
mythe et rdalitd, 139 PETITES AFFICHES 22, 22 (2007) (the French public conceives of
the criminal law system as the entire French legal system).
85. In Lipietz, the plaintiffs' attorneys, whose objective, in the style of a U.S. tort
action, was to make a public statement, posted their briefs on line. The defendants'
did not.
86. Even the criminal trial generally is very rapid compared to its United States
counterpart, usually lasting no more than one day, albeit a long day.
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than their common law counterparts. Their professional recognition
does not depend on obtaining a high number of convictions, but on
87
functioning as able officers of the court in pursuit of the truth.
Thus, where victims sue for damages as part of criminal proceedings,
the case is brought by the state, after careful consideration by the
prosecutor-magistrate, a "standing magistrate," as prosecutors are
called in France, in contrast to the judges who are "sitting magistrates." The French prosecutor-magistrate traditionally has tended to
be highly receptive to direction from the executive branch (the Minister of Justice), particularly in politically sensitive cases, and subsequently by the judge-magistrate. Consequently, national memory and
history are deemed to be in capable hands when entrusted to the
criminal court. The perception of the Lipietz case, however, was that
since it was not tried in a criminal court, the message to the public
was at the mercy of a plaintiffs' lawyer,88 who ipso facto was motivated to emphasize only one side of the dispute.
The general civilian view of criminal law as having an important
role in educating the public, means that the outcome of cases is
deemed to concern far more than the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The court must weigh the effect that its decision will have on
the public's idea of what the state values.8 9 This judicial consideration is a hallmark of continental European legal systems. Moreover,
in France, where the tradition of Rousseau is particularly powerful,
each citizen is conceived of as a public person, who has shed private
interests as part of the social contract, thus forming the general
will. 90 The criminal law judge instructs the citizenry in that
capacity. 9 1
In Lipietz, these public issues involved France's position with respect to the memory of the Vichy era. The French government had
played a central role since the war in determining whether and when
Vichy-era French defendants subject to partiecivile complaints would
be prosecuted for crimes. 92 Further, with respect to financial restitu87. In France in particular, prosecutors are sufficiently viewed as neutral that

defendants ask for their increased role in criminal cases, with a concomitant reduction of the role of police.
88. See Wieviorka, supra note 60.
89. See, e.g., German Federal Constitutional Court's concern about depenalizing
abortions under German criminal law in terms of the message this might send to the
public about the state's valuing of life. BVerfGE 1 (1975); West German Abortion Decision: A contrastto Roe v. Wade, (Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby, trans.), 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PRoc. 605 (1976).
90. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SoCIAL

(Flammarion, 2001) (1762).
91. For a French political scientist's contemporary presentation of the separation
into citizens' private and public beings, see GUPHENNO, supra note 72, who perhaps
not coincidentally is the son of a great Rousseau scholar, the late Jean Gu6henno. See,
e.g. JEAN GUPHENNO, JEAN-JACQUES (in two volumes, 1952).
92. See Curran, supra note 23 (influence of French executive branch on prosecu-

tors answering to the Minister of Justice). On President Mitterrand's hidden Vichy
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tion to victims, the French state had decided that the CIVS was to be
the organ of compensation in a process under its aegis. 9 3 Thus, in
Lipietz, the administrative court was usurping not just an interpretive and didactic function that properly belonged to the criminal law
courts, but also appropriating the task of determining the victim's
financial compensation which the government in this case specifically
had allocated to a designated executive branch institution specially
created for this purpose, making the judiciary superfluous to the
task.9 4 Further exacerbating the problem of the tort trial was that
the political and historical developments described in Part II above,
which over time had acclimated the public to think of the Vichy era
had left largely inas a period of French governmental wrongdoing,
95
tact the public's positive image of the SNCF.
C. Civil Damages and Tort Actions
France is not alone among civilian states to contemplate a criminal trial and conviction for grave human rights violations as the requisite bases for a victim's compensatory claims. 9 6 The proposed
past that may have influenced his government's effectively halting such trials, see
P9AN, supra note 32.
93. See supra note 42, and surrounding text.
94. See Banifatemi, supra note 49, at 112.

95. The Lipietz plaintiffs' written submissions emphasized the collaborationist
tendency of SNCF management as contrasted with that of their employees, the railway workers. The historian Jean-Marc Dreyfus concurs with plaintiffs' position that
the SNCF to date has failed to make an adequate effort to unveil its role in the deportations. See Jean-Marc Dreyfus, La SNCF rate le train de l'histoire, LIBERATION, Sept.
8, 2006, at 29.
96. See Jamie O'Connell, Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human
Rights Violators Console Their Victims?, 46 HARv. INT'L. L.J. 295, 297, n.16 (2005)
(noting Argentina as an exception). On difficulties of enforcement of American tort
actions as contrary to fundamental civilian laws and values or ordre public where
they include punitive damages, see Volker Behr, Enforcement of United States Money
Judgments in Germany, 13 J. L. & COM. 211 (1994); Scott R. Jablonski, Translation
and Comment: Enforcing U.S. Punitive Damages Awards in Foreign Courts - A Recent Case in the Supreme Court of Spain, 24 J. L. & COM. 225 (2005); Lucia Ostoni,
ItalianRejection of PunitiveDamages in a U.S. Judgment, 24 J. L. & COM. 245 (2005);
Joachim Zekoll, The Enforceability of American Money Judgments Abroad: A
Landmark Decision by the German Federal Court of Justice, 30 COL. J. INT'L L. 30
(1992). With respect to the uneasy reaction in France to ATCA cases, see Jean-Fran-

Vois Flauss, Compdtence civile universelle et droit internationalgdndral, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: Jus Cogens and Obligations
Erga Omnes 385-414 (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds. 2006); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996); Isabelle Moulier, Observations
sur l'Alien Tort Claims Act et ses implicationsinternationales,49 ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS
DE DR. INTL 129 (2003). As noted by Professor Beth Van Schaak, with one "paltry"
exception, "no judgment stemming from cases seeking to enforce human rights norms
in the United States has ever been enforced" abroad. Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of

Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in the Context of
the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141, 170 (2001). See
also Flauss, supra this note, at 390-91; Moulnier, supra this note, at 156-57 (U.S. civil
damage judgments for human rights violations not enforceable abroad). Accord,
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Hague Convention with respect to jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments does not include mutual enforcement of civil judgments for crimes such as human rights violations.9 7 Unable to bridge the gap between the common and civil law
98
approaches, the negotiators decided to omit the issue altogether.
According to Professor Beth Stephens, civilian negotiators to the
Hague Convention "viewed universal jurisdiction as limited to criminal prosecutions and thus irrelevant to a convention governing jurisdiction over civil claims," 99 notwithstanding the fact that in the
Anglo-American world, civil claims are a principal avenue of redress
for victims of grave human rights crimes.
Since many civilian systems permit financial compensation to
victims of crimes within the context of the criminal prosecution, why
should the Anglo-American tort action to allow civil recovery to the
victims of grave human rights crimes appear to be a travesty of justice to civilians? Indeed, U.S. tort damages for criminal conduct have
been suggested as sufficiently analogous to the civil law mechanism
for allotting civil damages as part of criminal proceedings as to present no fundamental conflict in legal values with civilian legal
systems.100

In his concurring opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,101 Justice
Breyer, reflecting on the previously stated goal of the U.S. Supreme
Court to keep U.S. law in "workable harmony" with the rest of the
world, 10 2 reasoned that international
consensus concerns [universal] criminal jurisdiction, but
consensus as to universal criminal jurisdiction itself suggests that universal tort jurisdiction would be no more
threatening. That is because the criminal courts of many nations combine civil and criminal proceedings, allowing those
injured by criminal conduct to be represented, and to recover
damages, in the criminal proceeding itself. Thus, universal

Jonathan Clark, Are InternationalInstitutions Doing Their Job? InternationalLitigation: Trends and Developments, 90 ASIL PRoc. 62, 74 (1996).
97. See Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, availableat
http://www.hcch.netlindex-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98 (last visited Mar. 8,
2007).
98. See Van Schaack, supra note 96.
99. Beth Stephens, TranslatingFilartiga:A Comparative and InternationalLaw
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 27 YALE J.
INT'L. L. 1, 54 (2002).
100. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762-63 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring); Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The EmergingRecognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INTL L. 142 (2006); Stephens, supra note 99.
101. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762-63.
102. Id. at 761.
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a significant
criminal jurisdiction necessarily contemplates
3
10
degree of civil tort recovery as well.

Justice Breyer's perspective may illuminate a path towards future transnational legal harmonization between the common and
civil law worlds. At least one sitting justice on France's Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnel), Olivier Dutheillet de
Lamothe, agrees that Justice Breyer's assessment in Sosa is valid for
French acceptance of U.S. universal tort jurisdiction. 10 4 Frequently,
however, civilians argue that U.S. tort verdicts for criminal conduct
should not benefit from international comity. 0 5 Critics of the Lipietz
plaintiffs and decision in particular have emphasized the impropriety
06
of awarding monetary damages for the criminal matters involved.'
Yet neither position can be due to the critics' perception of monetary
damages as inappropriate compensation for crime victims generally,
since, as Justice Breyer notes, civil law systems often grant such
damages.
As Justice Breyer and other eminent common law commentators
believe, the action for civil damages may pose no threat to fundamental civilian legal values. 10 7 To date, however, it has continued to be
perceived as doing so with some frequency because of a complicated
network of historical assumptions underlying traditional civilian opposition to privatizing justice.10 8 The tort action is considered to be a
privatization of justice, while the criminal action, considered to involve public law, 10 9 is not.
In France, as in most civilian states, criminal law is considered
to be public law, with cases heard in France in special criminal law
courts that anomalously, for historical reasons, are organized as part
103. Id. at 762-63. Cf. argument of Lipietz plainitffs' lawyer: "[Given that this suit
is for compensatory damages, there is no reason to differentiate between whether it
was brought by means of a partie civile action in a criminal prosecution or in another
[i.e., non-criminal] court." Rgplique, 28 octobre 2002, available at http://lipietz.net/imprime.php3?idarticle=1854, copyright lipietz.net-Perline (last visited June 7, 2006).
104. Personal conversation of author with Justice Dutheillet de Lamothe, May 15,
2007.
105. See, e.g., Banifatemi, supra note 49, at 113 (suggesting that the United States'
system of universal civil jurisdiction is unreasonable and that an alternative which
might allow international comity would be to rely on international law in all cases
brought in the United States); supra note 97, and surrounding text (Hague Convention negotiators' silence on issue due to inability to resolve intersystemic conflict of
views).
106. See supra note 60.
107. See supra notes 101-104, and surrounding text; Stephens, supra note 99; Van
Schaak, supra note 96.
108. See Stephens, supra note 99. See, e.g., Veil & KIugman, supra note 60; Wieviorka, supra note 60; Klarsfeld, supra note 60 (civilian reaction to Lipietz Decision).
For a thoughtful analysis of ATCA which includes the observation that, by privatizing
international human rights law, it undermines classic public international law, see
Flauss, supra note 96, at 391-92.
109. See DAVID, supra note 22, at 119.
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of the private law court system. 110 As we saw in Part III.B, the objection to privatization concerns numerous aspects of civilian societies,
including (1) the role of the state as the shepherd of public life; (2) the
public-private law divide in which criminal trial proceedings unfold
in marked contrast to non-criminal trial proceedings; and (3) the role
of criminal law cases in educating society, including the role of the
state in formulating messages of ethics and historical memory. The
frequent critique of monetary awards in French criticism of tort damages for underlying criminal acts"' thus may be misleading inasmuch as it is primed on the form of the damages rather than the form
of the action. The French system traditionally has tended not to perceive the tort action as appropriate for dealing with issues involving
immoral, criminal conduct. It rejects
penal,.., multiple... [or] so-called general damages against
defendants whose conduct appears to be malicious ... If the
judgment of the community is going to be brought to bear on
a defendant because of the [imimoral character of his action,
it must be done through the process of criminal law... [just
as] no penalty [may] be assessed for something ... not legally defined as a crime .... 112
Indeed, in the nineteenth century, some French legal scholars
were even of the view that non-pecuniary loss, such as loss to honor
or dignity, should not be eligible for monetary compensation. 11 3 Professor Stephens has argued that civilian objections to U.S. courts'
awarding crime victims damages in tort proceedings may project civilian systemic characteristics onto U.S. law, and reflect a lack of understanding of the tort lawsuit's attributes within the U.S. legal
system.114
Seen from within the logic of U.S. law, tort law fulfills some of
the functions that a French jurist would consider to be part of a criminal law proceeding; namely, (1) offering a public airing of the plaintiffs' suffering and defendants' moral transgressions; and (2)
constituting a search for justice rather than for money, particularly
110. See id.

111. See, e.g. Wieviorka supra note 60; Veil & Klugman, supra note 60; Stephens,
supra note 99, at 12 ("Labeling [violent crimes] as torts and seeking redress through
private lawsuits provokes the concern that... an affront against all of humanity has
been reduced to an issue of money and financial compensation.").
112. JOHN

HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL.,

THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN

1022 (1994).
113. James Gordley, When Is the Use of Foreign Law Possible? A Hard Case: The
Protection of Privacy in Europe and the United States, 67 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1076, 1078
(2007). It became standard practice for claims of moral damage to be for the symbolic
amount of one franc ('le franc symbolique"). See RENE DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND
FRENCH LAW: A COMPARISON IN SUBSTANCE 166 (1980).
114. See Stephens, supra note 99, at 50.
AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA
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in the context of grave human rights violations. 115 When class action
suits recently were restricted under U.S. law, and plaintiffs' lawyers
primarily seeking monetary compensation began to make increasing
use of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), the pro bono bar of legal
academics and others, who had dominated the assertion of civil
claims for underlying criminal human rights violations, expressed
dismay. In their view, the ATCA was becoming debased by association with financial compensation as an ultimate goal, a characteristic
of which tort suits brought pursuant to the ATCA formerly had been
116
free.
Not all of the functions important to traditional French public
law trials concerning criminal acts are, or can be, fulfilled by a
French tort trial, however. Most notably, the role of the state in continental European criminal proceedings is a significant factor in legitimating the process, including the award of victim compensation. In
the Anglo-American political culture, the tort action's public dimenthis aspect which is so important to the
sion does not approximate
7
civilian legal tradition.11
Consequently, a full-scale importation into the French legal system of the tort cause of action for crimes against humanity would
create considerable difficulties. By contrast, continental European
enforcement of U.S. judgments, the focus of Professor Stephens,1 1 8 as
well as of Justice Breyer in the passage quoted earlier from his concurring opinion in Sosa,1 19 would involve far fewer trade-offs for a
country such as France.
It is an important undertaking for both the common law and the
civil law worlds to pry apart the ideals with which tort suits are associated. Common law courts will benefit from a deeper understanding
of civilian legal thought processes when they consider their decisions
in light of comity issues. For the civil law world, the extent to which
the common law tort trial shares some of the public characteristics of
the continental European criminal trial may enable civil law countries to reassess the value of recognizing and enforcing common law
tort judgments. Further, the undertaking is valuable if only because
civil law systems are likely to see an increase in successful domestic
115. See, eg, LOBEL, supra note 18; Steinhardt, supra note 19; Adam Liptak, ClassAction Firms Extend Reach to Global Rights Cases, N.Y. Times, June 3, 2007, at 27.
116. Liptak, supra note 115. See also Steinhardt, supra note 19, at 25 ("[ATCA]
plaintiffs are rarely if ever motivated by the prospect of making money out of their
ordeals . . . "). In addition, it has been argued that U.S. tort law is akin to civilian
public law because it effects risk distribution rather than merely compensation of
harm. See Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization,Privatization,54 Am. J. COMp. L. 843, 848 (2006).
117. See supra notes 84-86, and surrounding text.
118. See supra note 99.
119. See supra note 103.
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tort actions concerning criminal acts, for the reasons developed in
this article.
In Italy, in 2004, the Corte di cassazione approved an award of
damages under tort law to victims who sued concerning crimes Germany had committed against them during World War 11.120 In
France, it already is a fact that, since the government did not appeal
the Administrative Court of Toulouse's verdict against it in the
Lipietz case, the Lipietz Decision is final insofar as establishing tort
liability for a grave underlying crime. The significance of such a court
decision must be taken in context, however: i.e, that of a legal system
in which judicial precedents have a different status than under a
common law regime of stare decisis. Moreover, the decision left unresolved potentially critical outstanding issues concerning the status
of the crime against humanity due to the court's notable silence on
plaintiffs' harm without refthose issues. Indeed, the court described
12
erence to the crime plaintiff claimed. '
At the supranational level, the European courts are becoming intimately familiar with the workings and inner logic of both the common and civil law traditions, reasoning with some frequency by
reference to non-European law, and bringing common law methods to
the attention of all member states' legal communities. Especially the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) looks beyond the European Convention on Human Rights and the law of its signatory states
to consider the law of still other nations, including Canadian and
American legislation and judicial opinions.' 2 2 A prominent recent
ECtHR decision citing U.S. law arose as a tort action brought in the
23
United Kingdom concerning alleged underlying criminal conduct.'
At the international level, 2007 saw the first International Court of
by another state for civil
Justice decision in which a state was sued
124
damages based on a claim of genocide.
120. See Andrea Bianchi, Ferrini v. FederalRepublic of Germany, Italian Court of
Cassation,March 11, 2004, 99 AM. J. INT'L. L. 242 (2005).
121. See Lipietz Decision. Most notably, while the court otherwise adopted all of
the commissairedu gouvernement's opinion, it did not agree or disagree, but remained
silent, where the commissaire's opinion advised the court to rule against plaintiffs
with respect to their criminal claim and their argument that the absence of a statutory period of the crime against humanity should apply to their non-criminal claims.
It thus remains for the Conseil d'Ptat to respond to these issues.
122. On Canadian law, see, e.g., Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R.
155; on U.S. law, see, e.g., A1-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79.
123. See Al-Adsani, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79. The Europena Court of Human
Rights held that the U.K. had not violated the European Convention by granting sovereign immunity to a foreign government sued civilly in the British courts for having
tortured the plaintiff abroad.
124. Bosnia and Herzegovina had sued the former Yugoslavia in 1993, with the
court's decision affecting its successors, Serbia and Montenegro. See Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Feb. 26, 2007), available at http:/l
www.icj-cij.org/homepage/index.php?lang=en (last visited Aug. 1, 2007). Cf. Herv6 As-
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Teasing apart correlations within the French legal tradition that
jurists may not readily perceive to be dissociable ultimately may suggest to France's political and legal communities that the tort action
for victims of crimes against humanity will be capable of integration
into their society without violating fundamental values. As discussed
in Part V, such domestic tort actions independent of any criminal
trial will require adaptive measures within the legal order, 125 but
they need not signify a systemic death knell, as has been suggested
as
by two French attorneys who described the Lipietz12Decision
6
"funeste" ("fatal/disastrous") to French law and society.
If the French pattern is indicative of what other civil law countries with a similar legal tradition will experience, the tort action for
grave human rights violations will be attempted on behalf of plaintiffs who for one reason or another are foreclosed from seeking redress in criminal court. 12 7 In a globalized climate in which numerous
common law imports are widely discussed, considered, and some
adopted, the tort suit for such acts will be attempted recurrently and
is likely to continue to make inroads into national law.128

censio, La Responsabilitgselon la Cour internationalede justice dans l'affairede gdnocide bosniaque. 2 REV. G8N. DR. INT'L. PUBLIC 285, 298 (2007) (The ICJ "reasoned like
a criminal judge ...but without the means of a criminal judge.").
125. See infra notes 189-195, and surrounding text.
126. See Veil & Kiugman, supra note 60.
127. This had been attempted unsuccessfully earlier by others. See infra notes
1323-40, and surrounding text. Where a successful action had been brought in Greece
against Germany by Greek victims of war-time atrocities, the action was held unenforceable in Germany. See Decision of June 23, 2003, 56 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 3488 (2003), translated in 42 INT'L. LEG. MAT. 1030 (2003), partly reviewed
and affd, 12 BvR 1476, Feb. 15, 2006, analyzed in Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well
Do U.S. Judgments Fare In Europe?, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L. REV. - (forthcoming),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1022680.
128. Italy reformed its criminal procedure in 1988 to create a more adversarial
system on the United States model. See Elisabetta Grande, Italian CriminalJustice:
Borrowingand Resistance, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2000). In France, a limited form of
plea bargaining was adopted recently, but legislation proposed by President Chirac to
institute a limited form of class action suits in consumer protection law failed to win
legislative approval. See Thomas Bronnec, Le gouvernement renonce e la class action,
L'ExPRESS, Jan. 30, 2007, available at http://www.lexpress.fr/info/quotidienl
actu.asp?id=8694 (last visited Jan. 30, 2007) (although President Sarkozy's government will be proposing it again, with a better chance of success due to the changed
composition of Parliament since the legislative elections of June, 2007). See infra note
192, and surrounding text. Suggestions to institute a more adversarial criminal law
system in France were debated in the aftermath of nation-wide soul-searching over
the potential for abuse of French criminal law judges due to their extraordinary powers. The reforms that ultimately were adopted rejected such a response to the affaire
d'Outreau as inappropriate. See Pradel, Les suites lMgislatives de l'affaire dite
d'Outreau, 14 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE 13 (Apr. 4, 2007).
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INITIATING LEGAL TRANSNATIONALIZATION IN THE

GLOBALIZATION ERA

How and why does national law start to depart from its traditions, and what is the role of globalization in transnationalizing it?
More specifically, if the introduction of a tort action for complicity in
a crime against humanity inspired by the American model meets
with deep resistance in French legal culture, why did the plaintiffs in
the Lipietz case decide to bring a tort case, and why did the court rule
in their favor?
A.

Litigants' Reasons for TransnationalizingLaw

As plaintiffs explained, they were unable to bring an action in
criminal court because there were no individual defendants alive or
known to them, thus foreclosing the possibility of a criminal prosecution. 129 The lack of an equivalent in French law to U.S. style discovery hampered their efforts to locate the one individual whose identity
they knew, and against whom they believed they would have been
able to file their complaint in criminal court if he were alive and if
they could locate him. 130 His post-war whereabouts may have been
known to the government and SNCF, but, as plaintiffs stated in one
of their court submissions, neither defendant revealed to plaintiffs
what they might have known about his whereabouts or even if he still
was alive. 13 1 Under French law prior to the Lipietz Decision, plaintiffs' inability to locate an individual guilty of criminal conduct would
have placed the defendants beyond any legal reach of the victims.
The Lipietz plaintiffs were not the first to try to recover in noncriminal proceedings for Vichy-era wrongs that were criminal in nature. In 1999, Kurt Schaechter first brought a partie civile criminal
suit against the SNCF for complicity in crimes against humanity,
based on the SNCF's deportation of his parents to their deaths in
1942, but the criminal court dismissed his case because, like the
Lipietz plaintiffs, Mr. Schaechter had been unable to identify any
specific individual who had carried out the crimes on behalf of the
defendant.' 3 2 In 2003, Mr. Schaechter then sued the SNCF in civil
129. Supra note 4.
130. See id. Plaintiffs attorney indicated to me that he subsequently learned that
the individual in question had not been responsible for plaintiffs' harm.
131. See Rdplique sur les mdmoires transmis le 3 mars 2006, supra note 32.
132. Un proc~s sur les rails, available at http://www.l.allaincefr.com/srticle-60-226-1130html (last visited July 20, 2007); La SNCF ne serapas condamnde pourdeportation, LIBERATION, June 8, 2004, available on site of Association frangaise Buchenwald Dora et Kommandos, at http://www.buchenwald-dora.fr/4documentation/rp2/
3act/3reconn/04 (last visited July 19, 2007). Until 1994, French law did not permit
organizations to be prosecuted for criminal acts by their employees and the court held
that the 1994 law could not be applied retroactively. See Adam Sage, TIMES ONLINE,
Mar. 17, 2003, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article1120342.ece (last visited July 19, 2007); French railway is sued by son of death
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court, but the civil court, the Paris tribunal de grande instance, held
that the statute of limitations barred his suit on the ground that only
the crime against humanity would not be so barred. Since he was not
asserting a claim for crimes at all (like the Lipietz plaintiffs, he had
to assert a theory of tortious wrongdoing since he was not in a criminal court), the Paris tribunal de grande instance dismissed the case.
He appealed, but, in 2004, the Paris Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal.

133

Although Mr. Schaechter had modeled his unsuccessful civil suit
on the U.S. tort action for underlying criminal acts, he had not asked
for compensatory damages. Rather, he had asked only for the symbolic amount of one euro.13 4 Mr. Schaechter thus had obviated criticism that he was motivated by financial greed. He had anticipated
the criticism that later would be leveled against the Lipietz plaintiffs
for requesting non-symbolic compensatory damages in a non-criminal
court. Mr. Schaechter had explained at the time he brought his civil
suit that he did not want more than a symbolic amount because
money could not make up for the loss of his parents: "It is a merely
symbolic sum, but what can you ask for the lives of your parents?
There is no amount that you can fix for that. This is a case for history,
so that people remember what happened." 13 5 Even so, when he decided to continue the fight in civil court, Mr. Schaechter gained notoriety and provoked considerable controversy for his attempt to break
new legal ground by bringing an action independently of any criminal
law context.
Parallel to Mr. Schaechter's case was a similar suit brought by
Jean-Jacques Fraenkel, the son of a famous French dentist and officer who had been deported and murdered at Auschwitz, as had been
his wife two years later. 136 Mr. Fraenkel's case was less well known
than Mr. Schaechter's because it was nipped in the bud for alleged
insufficient proof to go forward with a criminal prosecution. 137 Unlike
Mr. Schaechter, Mr. Fraenkel did not pursue his claims in a French
civil court after being rejected by the criminal court. Instead, he decamp

Jews,

TIMES

ONLINE

(U.K.),

Mar.

17,

2003,

available at

http://

www.jewishtribunalreview.org/klctz.htm (last visited July 20, 2007).
133. Supra note 132; Les familles de 200 anciens ddportds demandent rdparationit
la SNCF, source: Associated Press, Aug. 28, 2006, available at http://
clubobs.nouvelobs.com/article/2006/08/28/20060828.FAP8364.xml (last visited Feb.
23, 2007).
134. See Sage, supra note 132; Wieviorka, supra note 60; Gordley, supra note 113;
DAVID,

supra note 113.

135. See Sage, supra note 132.
136. See Julie Remy, Frenchman Suing France Over Holocaust Deportation,
REUTERS, Dec. 30, 1998, availableat http://www.vho.org/News/GB/SRN36_98.html#9
(last visited July 21, 2007); FrenchRailways in Holocaust Row, BBC NEWS, Jan. 12,
1999, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/253201.stm (last visited
July 21, 2007).
137. See supra note 136.
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cided to become a named plaintiff in a U.S. class action tort suit
against the SNCF. 138 The initial U.S. case was unsuccessful because
the SNCF was deemed to benefit from foreign sovereign immunity. In
2006, however, Mr. Fraenkel became a plaintiff in a second, modified
U.S. class action suit 139 that avoided the sovereign immunity problem by alleging conduct not subject to immunity under the Foreign
140
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).
In Lipietz, plaintiffs made clear that they were aware of the
highly publicized Schaechter case, as well as of the U.S. tort cases
based on substantially similar Vichy-era facts. 14 ' The Lipietz plaintiffs have been excoriated for requesting what in France are significant monetary damages, but, like typical U.S. counterparts in cases
of grave human rights violations, they are unapologetic, and have defended in the French and world-wide media their right to4 2receive financial compensation for the harm defendants inflicted.'
Echoing others, one critic in particular explicitly contrasted the
Lipietz plaintiffs' prayer for damages with Mr. Schaechter's symbolic
damages request as proof that financial gain was the Lipietz plaintiffs' motive.' 43 Plaintiffs' conduct suggests otherwise, however. Indeed, some of their legal strategy skirted dangerously close to the
quixotic, but it remained consistent with the Anglo-American version
of the tort law suit as a vehicle for breaking new legal ground as
much for other similarly situated victims in the future as for
themselves.
In particular, plaintiffs stated a claim for complicity in a crime
against humanity, despite the fact that the administrative court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over criminal matters. 4 4 Had
their objective been pecuniary, it would have been a safer tactic to
assert exclusively non-criminal theories of recovery, since the very
allegation of the crime against humanity as the crux of their suit
might have backfired if the court had interpreted it to be a concession
that their cause of action was one of criminal law. To have forgone
alleging the crime, however, would have altered the nature of the
138. Abrams v. Socidt6 Nationale des Chemins de Fers Fran~ais, 175 F. Supp. 2d
423 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), vacated, 332 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 901
(2004).
139. Freund v. Republic of France (Case No. 06-CV-1637, S.D.N.Y.). See Sage,
supra note 132 (quoting Mr. Fraenkel with respect to the second class action suit).
140. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (2002).
141. See Plaidoirie,supra note 4.
142. Two of Georges Lipietz' children have discussed their views at length on their
websites. See http://helene.lipietz.net/; http://lipietz.net; plaintiffs' lawyer has appeared in a well-publicized French television program to debate two prominent critics,
Arno Klarsfeld and Raphael Delpard. LCI, Dec. 2006 (CD on file with author, further
dissemination thereof subject to applicable copyright law).
143. Wieviorka supra note 60; see also Veil & Klugman, supra note 60.
144. See Plaidoirie,supra note 4.
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case for plaintiffs bent on holding the defendants accountable for
crimes in as public a manner as possible.
Similarly, they argued that even their non-criminal law claims
should benefit from immunity to any statute of limitations, even
though in France only the crime against humanity is not subject to
any limitations period. 145 This argument is noteworthy in that it was
not necessary, since their alternative argument concerning France's
version of the discovery rule for the applicable non-criminal law limitations periods was sufficient to prevent their suit from being deemed
time-barred. The real problem was that, unless the court agreed that
the lack of a limitations period which attached to crimes against humanity applied to this case, other victims would be barred from suing
the state after 2007, and would be barred from suing the SNCF after
September, 2006 (only three months after the June, 2006 administra146
tive court decision).
The court might have deemed plaintiffs' argument that the crime
against humanity's absence of limitations governed all of their case to
signify that plaintiffs recognized the case as one belonging in criminal court, and, therefore, that the court should dismiss the action entirely, as the Paris Court of Appeals had dismissed the Schaechter
case. The fact that plaintiffs made such strategic decisions anchors
their lawsuit in the Anglo-American tradition of viewing the tort action for underlying human rights violations as a means of breaking
new legal ground, and of making a public statement, rather than as a
money-making proposition. 147 Further evidence that plaintiffs were
embarking on a common law tort undertaking may be inferred from
the detailed advice given publicly as soon as the court's decision was
known, on the web site of H6lne Lipietz, daughter and successor in
interest to plaintiff Georges Lipietz, addressed to other victims con145. For a more extensive discussion of this issue in the context of Vichy-era acts,
see Curran, supra note 23, at 73-94.
146. With respect to the state, the statute of limitations for acts other than crimes
against humanity would be four years, but under the French version of the discovery
rule, it would have started to run from the time it was or could be known that the
current government might be held liable in a court action for harm caused by the
Vichy regime. See Conclusions de Jean-Christophe Truilhd, Commissaire du government, available at http://a1692.g.allamai.net/f/1692/2042/ld/valentin-teixeira.blog.
lemonde.fr/files/conclusions_ta_toulouseO104248.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2007). According to plaintiffs, the running of this statutory period would have started with the
Conseil d'Etat's Papon decision, when it was published officially in 2004, although it
had been rendered in 2002, or, according to the commissaire du gouvernement's conclusions, with that court's Pelletierdecision of 2001, published officially in 2003. With
respect to the SNCF, the statutory period for acts other than crimes against humanity
would be ten years. According to plaintiffs and the commissaire, the discovery rule
date would be Sept. 1996, the publication date of a historical study reporting the
Vichy-era SNCF management's war-time conduct. Christian Bachelier, La SNCF sous
l'Occupation allemande 1940-1944 (generally referred to as "le rapport Bachelier"),
available at http://www.ahicf.com/rapport/av-propos.htm, with further links to entirety of document provided at that page (last visited July 24, 2007).
147. See supra note 60.
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sidering a lawsuit, 148 and from the fact that plaintiffs posted their
written court submissions on the Internet throughout the proceedings, although such submissions are not in the public domain under
French law.
The Lipietz case thus is the first tort suit successfully brought in
France for crimes against humanity. The first steps in the legal
transnationalization process were initiated where the usual national
law avenue of recourse, the criminal action, was foreclosed. The idea
for a non-traditional suit resulted from the tort actions brought in the
United States for war-time criminal conduct, including those already
brought by former French residents and citizens against French defendants. For its part, the French judiciary first had rejected this
model in the Schaechter case, but the idea did not go away, and, in
Lipietz, the court's unofficial adoption of the common law approach to
compensatory damages in tort law for crimes against humanity allowed the plaintiffs both the symbolic victory that Mr. Schaechter
had sought but had been denied, as well as recovery of compensatory
monetary damages.
B.

JudicialReasons for TransnationalizingLaw: International
Forum Shopping and National Sovereignty

While the litigants' motivation in transnationalizing law arose
from the inspiration for a novel cause of action that foreign law provided when their own legal system otherwise would have left them
with no legal recourse, it remains to be explained what the judicial
motivation is to transnationalize domestic law even where to do so is
a foreseeably unpopular step. As the distance between nations loses
significance through modem technology and global business, and as
parties increasingly can assert colorable arguments of jurisdiction in
more than one country, national courts more and more often are being displaced by the domestic courts of other nations. 149 The population shifts that modern wars have caused are one source of litigants
148. See http://helene.lipietz.net (last visited Aug. 12, 2006). Included in the advice
are suggested damage amounts that victims might request, depending on the extent
of the harm they suffered. This figured as one of many aspects of advice she posted,
but was singled out for criticism by Professor Wieviorka as evidence that plaintiffs'
goals were monetary in nature. See supra note 60. One might reach the opposite inter-

pretation, however: namely, that plaintiffs brought their suit as a mechanism for calling the defendants to account precisely not for plaintiffs' personal gain, but for all of
defendants' similarly situated victims. Since class action suits do not exist in France,
the litigation opportunities of other victims or the amounts they can claim are independent of all other plaintiffs' claims.
149. The other increasingly important source of judicial displacement is international arbitration. See, e.g., Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the
Laws and Practicesof InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 30 TEx. INT'L. L. J. 1, 7
(1995).
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with opportunities to select a forum beyond national confines. 150 The
vastly grown contacts of an increasingly mobile world, in terms of
people, capital and jobs, is another. 15 1 In criminal law, some civilian
nation-states have been adopting universal jurisdiction, recognizing
causes of action with respect to specified crimes rooted neither in con15 2
cepts of geography nor national sovereignty.
In the United States, the ATCA, enacted in 1789, was revived in
1980, allowing U.S. federal courts to entertain cases in which torts
may have been committed anywhere in the world.1 53 The legal immunity foreign governments enjoy is limited by the enumerated exceptions in the FSIA.15 4 Foreign governmental immunity was
constricted further in 2004 by a United States Supreme Court ruling
that the FSIA exceptions can be applied retroactively to claims based
55
on events that predated the FSIA's enactment.1
Precisely because globalization has not produced global law, and
precisely because globalization coexists with national legal diversity,
it now is causing nation-states to confront the specter of compromised
national sovereignty when parties are able to seek adjudication elsewhere. In a world of frenetic mobility in which causes of action travel
as they become ever more arguably multinational,
national courts in56
creasingly compete with each other.'
In Lipietz, plaintiffs raised the specter of international forum
shopping to suggest to the court that, if it dismissed the case, similarly situated plaintiffs simply would sue the French state and the
SNCF in the United States, where, as noted earlier, to the shock and
dismay of the French government, courts had denied motions to dismiss in previous lawsuits, and ensuing settlements had given rise to
negative publicity about the current French government's refusal to
150. Plaintiffs in U.S. actions who have sued France and French financial institutions for their World War II expropriations generally have fallen into this category.
151. See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, GLOBALIZATION: THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES (1998);
Hans Smit, Common and Civil Law Rules of In PersonamAdjudication Authority: An
Analysis of Underlying Policies, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 335, 336 (1972).
152. See, e.g., Volkerstrafsgesetzbuch, Teil 1, § 1 ("General Rules[:] ...

This Act

shall apply... even when the offense was committed abroad and has no connection to
Germany").
153. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
154. See supra note 140.
155. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
156. As others have suggested, globalization also means new sorts of fragmentation in law. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (Klaus A. Ziegert, trans.,
2004); MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, GLOBALISATION 9CONOMIQUE ET UNIVERSALISME DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME 6-7 (2004); Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural
Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419 (1992);

Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants:Good Faith in British Law or How Law Ends Up in
New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998); Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina':
Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther
Teubner ed., 1997).
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acknowledge the rights of Vichy's victims.1 5 7 That the French government was opposed to American courts' adjudicating such lawsuits
was clear, since it had filed an amicus brief in Bodner, vigorously arguing that acts committed in France against French nationals and
other non-Americans were not justiciable by U.S. courts under the
158
ATCA.
Plaintiffs asserted that U.S. courts characteristically lend a sympathetic ear to complaints against the French state and institutions
for conduct committed in France during the Vichy years:
The United States has made no mistake. Armed with laws of
universal jurisdiction, its courts have found several French
institutions sued by French claimants liable for crimes
against humanity committed during that period [i.e., the
Vichy years]. The SNCF already has been found liable by a
judgment not yet final; the [French] government is a defendant. Everything leads one to conclude that there is no obstacle to final verdicts9 by American courts for the crimes of
15
Vichy or the SNCF.
Plaintiffs asserted, moreover, that the issue was one of broad national importance, because the only way to preserve France's sovereignty over the quintessentially French legal issues their case
presented, was for the French court to resolve the issues under
French law. 160 Consequently, plaintiffs also were urging at least implicitly that the court needed to be sure French law sided with the
plaintiffs sufficiently so that similarly situated victims would be content to continue to bring suits in France and subject themselves to
16 1
French law and French court adjudication.
Real or anticipated international forum shopping's most transformative implications for law lie in its potential for reversing the
role of court and litigant. The very argument that national sovereignty depends on validating a party's claim or cause of action to pre157. See Plaidoirie,supra note 4. On the stunned reaction in France to the United
States' judicial holding in Bodner, see EIZENSTAT, supra note 38. See also Moulnier,
supra note 96, at 162 (the issues of Vichy expropriations more suitable for resolution
in France than in the United States).
158. See Banifatemi, supra note 50, at 96, n.83 (referencing Memorandum of Law
filed by French government in Bodner, Mar. 26, 1999).
159. Id.
160. See Plaidoirie,supra note 4; accord Moulnier, supra note 96, at 162. While
plaintiffs restricted their argument to one of national sovereignty ("souverainetg nationale"), Plaidoirie,supra note 4, and the sovereignty issue was the one that the
French government had raised in the amicus brief in Bodner, see supra note 158, their
presentation was such as to allow for the interpretation that they were appealing not
just to national sovereignty, but also to national honor.
161. Plaidoirie, supra note 4 ("How can victims of Vichy's anti-Semitism be
reproached for going to the United States to bring suit if the cause of action is doomed
to failure in France?").
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vent future parties from filing similar actions abroad implicitly
signifies that it no longer is the national court which evaluates the
parties' case, but the parties who evaluate the court's response to determine if it is sufficiently pleasing to them. The new-found possibilities for litigants to consider many countries of the world for the forum
most likely to suit them requires national courts to evaluate the impact that a negative decision will have on the country's ability to retain influence, rather than to focus exclusively on the merits of the
case under national law.
In order to assess the availability and likely substantive legal
consequences of international forum shopping in any given case, national courts would have to keep track of decisions abroad that might
encourage citizens to file suit abroad. This activity, typical of the
globalizing world, challenges national courts to understand the differing logic, the semiotic grammar, that governs foreign court decisions. The difficulties courts face in trying to understand foreign
cases recently was underscored by Justice Breyer in an appeal to U.S.
law schools to teach foreign law to their students. He urged that the
next generation of practicing attorneys be trained so as to be able to
educate American judges about relevant foreign law in their briefs, in
order that in appropriate
cases courts can learn from the example of
16 2
foreign counterparts.
The European Union member states already are engaged with
foreign case decisions on many levels. In the civil law world of continental Europe, and nowhere more than in France, the domestic legal
system since the enactment of the Civil Code in 1804, traditionally
presented itself as an all-encompassing, self-referential fabric of national norms from which the court was to deduce the correct solution
to each case in a process modeled on Cartesian logic. 1 63 Among other
factors, supranational European law has jostled this self-referential
tradition considerably, since domestic legislation in every E.U. member state became subject through the E.U. to review for compatibility
with European norms. 16 4 Thus, foreign member state court decisions
now constitute judicial applications of a newly common European
law, much as was true in the jus commune years following the recep162. "The people who tell us about it [i.e., foreign law] are the lawyers ... and the
law schools have to find the way ...[to teach it to them so that] it will come back to us
in the form of briefs as to what foreign law is." Author's transcription of Breyer, J.'s
remarks in public debate with Justice Guy Canivet of France's Conseil constitutionnel, Cardozo Law School, May 16, 2007.
163. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened
Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COL. J.
EUR.L. 63, 75-111 (2001). On the characteristically French veneration for Cartesian
logic and mathematics as a unifying historical principle, see IvAR EKELAND, THE BEST
OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS: MATHEMATICS AND DESTINY
ing Nature's Greatest Book, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct.

(2006); Freeman Dyson, Writ-

19, 2006, at 53.
164. See, e.g., Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, Comparative Constitutionalism in
Practice, 3 INT'L. J. CONST. L. 543, 550-56 (2004).
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tion of Roman law and preceding the nationalization of law that
culminated in national Civil Codes.
Today, however, interest in wider international legal harmonization and the specter of international forum shopping mean that national courts in E.U. member states also pay heed to non-European
national legal systems whose norms are not a source of legal authority. 16 5 Whatever the motivation, mutual transnational legal awareness and consultation can prove beneficial in increasing legal
harmony by further facilitating the myriad contacts which today's
ease of cross-border communication, travel and trade have enabled,
as well as in broadening the capacity of national judges and legislators to select legal importations from abroad.
Where retaining national sovereignty is a primary concern of a
court, however, legal importations from abroad may be made without
due consideration of their effects on national law. Where transnationalization leads courts to alter national law in order to salvage it from
becoming hostage to other countries' usurpations, the price of national control becomes national change, and national sovereignty considerations may overshadow important countervailing considerations
to change that merit attention and deliberation.
The "very potent competition among legal systems" has been
noted by a judge on the Conseil d'Atat.166 In Lipietz, neither the commissaire du gouvernement nor the court referred to plaintiffs' national sovereignty argument in, respectively, the commissaire du
gouvernement's opinion 167 or the court's decision. As a result, one
cannot be sure of the argument's effect, but the specter of foreign
courts' interfering in matters of one's national law is becoming a more
frequent prospect for all nations. For France in particular, not only
had U.S. courts accepted jurisdiction for claims against French institutions relating to their conduct during the Vichy years, but, in addition, the much-publicized LICRA v. Yahoo 168 case was ongoing
roughly at the same time as the Lipietz case.
In Yahoo, commercial globalization had allowed a French legal
verdict to be rendered vulnerable to U.S. judicial interference. Yahoo,
the U.S. defendant company, had forgone appealing to a higher
French court an adverse decision that a lower French court had rendered against it. Instead, it essentially appealed the French court's
165. National courts need to follow foreign cases for a variety of reasons. See id.;
RalfMichaels, The Re-State-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the
Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209, 1214 (2005).
166. Josseline de Clausade, La loi prot~ge-t-elle encore le faible lorsqu'elle est aussi
complexe, foisonnante et instable? 12 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE 539, 540 (2006).
167. See supra note 64.

168. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue contre le racisme et l'antis~mistisme, 169 F. Supp.
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), reh. 399 F.3d 1010 (9th
Cir. 2005), rev'd 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, La ligue contre le racisme
et l'antis~mitisme v. Yahoo! Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2332 (U.S. 2006).
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decision in the U.S. by shifting the forum to the Northern District of
California in a declaratory judgment action, where it argued that the
French verdict should be deemed unenforceable against it as a matter
of U.S. constitutional law. 16 9 The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held
that the U.S. district court had personal jurisdiction over the French
70
party (the plaintiff in the French action, now the defendant).,
It may seem questionable to suggest that international forum
shopping is part of legal transnationalization rather than of traditional conflicts (private international) law. Globalization has produced an altered order of magnitude in the volume of cases of
conflicts law in recent years, however, and the explosion in the quantity of cases has effected a qualitative change. The vastly increased
numbers of cases involving law from different nations do not just
mean that more courts need to make a conflicts of law decision.
Rather, the sheer numbers of such cases increasingly challenge the
17
effectiveness and fairness of applying the law of any nation. '
In Lipietz, to the extent that the Administrative Court of Toulouse may have been concerned about reasserting national adjudication of issues over which foreign courts recently have been asserting
jurisdiction, it may be tempting to view the case as evidence of a renationalization of law rather than of its transnationalization. It
would be a mistake, however, to interpret a judicial insistence on retaining national control as an affirmation of the capacity to preserve
the power of national law, especially where, as in Lipietz, the very
process of retaining sovereignty in a transnationalized context will
require a court to modify its national law and erode national legal
characteristics as the price of retaining sovereignty.
C. Foreign National Legal Norms in National Courts
One of the most elusive aspects of legal transnationalization is
the horizontal introduction of foreign law into domestic law cases
where foreign legal influences have no formal legal status. Parties
increasingly urge foreign national law and judges frequently recognize it sua sponte as globalization causes legal information to be ex172
changed across the boundaries of nation-states and legal systems.
169. See id.; Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in
2006: Twentieth Annual Survey, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 697 (2006).

170. Symeonides, supra note 169.
171. See Mathias Reimann, Comparative Private InternationalLaw, in THE OxFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1379 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmer-

mann eds., 2006) (describing a recent "wave of conflicts legislation [in dozens of
states] as a response to the globalization of the economy and the increased mobility of
people").
172. For a case decided in state court under California state law, in which the court
looked to French and Australian law for guidance on a novel issue involving bioethics,
see Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993). For a European
Court of Human Rights case in which the court looked to a Canadian case not decided
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Identifying influences is especially difficult where, as in France,
court decisions do not openly acknowledge foreign decisions or legal
practices. As a member of the Conseil constitutionnel writes, that
Court today is influenced by foreign legislation, practice and court
decisions, but "[t]his influence is... not apparent because the Conseil
constitutionnel makes no ...reference to foreign jurisprudence [i.e.,
cases]. ' 173 Indeed, the Conseil constitutionnel, "even when it derives
its inspirationfrom the decisions of foreign courts, does not refer to
them

.... "174

Parties for their part, as in Lipietz, introduce foreign law based
on its argued propriety for judicial consideration notwithstanding its
lack of official status. 175 In the Lipietz case, the plaintiffs mentioned
the foreign legal concept of equitable estoppel as a principle of law
that they wished were French, acknowledging its lack of legal status
in French law. 176 They nevertheless introduced it to the court in connection with the SNCF's argument that the administrative court
lacked jurisdiction over it because the SNCF had been a private corporation at all relevant times and thus was not amenable to suit in
the administrative law court system, reserved for actions involving
17 7
the government or government entities or agents.
Plaintiffs asserted that the SNCF should be estopped from making this argument because, according to plaintiffs, the SNCF had
taken the contrary position in a suit in the United States concerning
its Vichy-era conduct in which it claimed governmental immunity
from liability on the ground that it was a governmental entity. 178
Since equitable estoppel is not officially recognized in France, plaintiffs' counsel referred to it by its English name, and explained the
concept to the French court. 179 Comparative law scholarship suggests
not only that "most changes in most systems are the result of borrowing,"1 8 0 but also that the perceived prestige of a legal system is a central factor in a second system's borrowing from it, however poorly
understood the borrowed concept may be and however inept its
method of importation.' 8 ' Since the Lipietz Decision does not refer to
under the European Convention on Human Rights that governed, but, rather, under
the Canadian Charter, see Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 157.
173. Dutheillet de Lamothe, supra note 164, at 553.
174. Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
175. See generally

MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, LES FORCES IMAGINANTES DU DROIT.

LE RELATIF ET L'UNIVERSEL

(2004).

176. Plaidoirie,supra note 4.
177. Id.; Lipietz Decision.
178. Plaidoirie,supra note 4.
179. Id.
180. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 94 (1974).
181. See Elisabetta Grande, supra note 128, at 230-32; Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind
Changed: IntellectualLeadership in Western Law, 42 AM. J. COMp. L. 195, 206 (1994);
Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants:A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J.
COMp. L. 343, 398-99 (1991); Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J.
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the principle of equitable estoppel, one cannot know whether an unofficial borrowing occurred. Where a court may wish to transnationalize law by silently opening doors without analyzing what lies behind
or beyond them, gauging the impact of specific legal arguments is a
process of inference.
The benefits of judicial openness to foreign law are signal in a
world in which mutual harmony is a fast-growing necessity. Among
its starkest pitfalls, however, are the difficulties involved in apprising foreign law accurately, both for the parties urging it and for the
courts assessing it.182 However dedicated courts may be to following
foreign court decisions, the effectiveness of the undertaking will vary
depending on the extent to which national judicial readings of foreign
18 3
court decisions are informed by comparative legal understanding.
As lawyers and judges at ever-expanding levels and reaches of the
legal system discover that they have become global jurists, they will
need to focus increasingly on the comparative legal skills required to
84
translate the foreign into the familiar.'
In Lipietz, for instance, plaintiffs argued that statutes of limitation are unknown in many states, and in particular in Anglo-Saxon
ones, which is incorrect.' 8 5 It is a matter of pure speculation as to
whether the point had any effect on the court or whether the court
researched the subject independently. One can be confident, however,
that, as law transnationalizes in the unofficial processes that are the
subject of this article, intersystemic failures of understanding are
likely to be a significant collateral damage of globalization.
It is most difficult to ascertain the influence of foreign law that
neither is referred to, nor necessarily even experienced as such, gaining entry into courtrooms as parties', lawyers' and judges' increased
contacts abroad affect their legal thinking and alter their traditional
national legal mentality. Others have noted that witnesses and parties in France increasingly expect to be cross-examined in court because their concept of litigation has been constructed from imported
U.S. television series, even though there is no cross-examination in
CoMP. L. 335, 346, 350-51 (1996); Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American Law
in Europe, 39 Am. J. COMP. L. 229 (1991). Mattei has offered other analyses in more
recent work, such as Hard Core Now!, 2 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS (2007), available
at http://works.bepress.com/ugomattei/5 (last visited July 25, 2007); and A Theory of
Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 383 (2003).

182. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Re-Membering Law in the Internationalizing
World, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (2005).

183. See, e.g., Jane Stapleton, Benefits of Comparative Tort Reasoning: Lost in
Translation, 1 J. TORT L. - (2007) (available at www.bepress.com/cgi/view/
content.cgi?article=1053&context=jtl).
184. See id.; Vivian Grosswald Curran, Comparative Law and Language, in OxFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann
eds., 2006).
185. See Plaidoirie,supra note 4.
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French trials.1 8 6 For the same reason, non-lawyers in French courtrooms these days frequently address the presiding judge as "Votre
honneur," the literal French translation of "Your Honor," although
u8 7
the term of address in French is "Monsieurle Prgsident.'
V.

CONSEQUENTIAL ADAPTATIONS NECESSITATED BY LEGAL
TRANSNATIONALIZATION

Transnationalized law causes ripple effects within national legal
systems, and creates the need for adaptive measures if domestic legal
orders are to maintain their equilibrium as changes of foreign derivation make their way into the law. The Lipietz case signals some of the
challenges that national legal systems face, and increasingly will
face, as the speed of transnationalization outpaces legal orders' adaptive abilities.1 8 8 The indirect acceptance in the Lipietz decision of the
tort action as a vehicle for adjudicating the case of victims of a crime
against humanity under French law, where no criminal law adjudication has taken place, represents the importation of one aspect of the
common law legal system, but without the latter's mechanisms for
supporting it.
As a result of Lipietz, well over 1,000 new cases were filed.' 8 9
Since class actions do not exist in France, each victim or family
thereof must file a separate lawsuit, creating a massive judicial burden. 190 French law's rejection of American-style class action suits has
been maintained for reasons deemed essential to the French conception of justice as individualized.19' Even a modest attempt to intro186. See L'AMtRICANISATION DU DROIT 7 (Bernard Audit ed., 2001). On the influence of television on the French public's idea of law, see BARBARA VILLEZ, SERIES T9Le
VISIONS DE LA JUSTICE (2006). Reforms to France's Criminal Code in 2000 allow for
defense attorneys and prosecutors to question parties and witnesses directly, rather

than to suggest questions to judges for them to ask. It has been suggested that this
reform is the first step towards a French version of cross-examination; but see Christophe Ayela & David Dass-Le Deist, Le dveloppement de la cross examination dans le
proc~s pdnal franqais, 46 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE 2091, 2091-95 (Nov. 15, 2006) (the
ability to ask questions directly to parties and witnesses, already a dubious analogy to
cross-examination, is limited to criminal trials).
187. L'AMRICANISATION DU DROIT, supra note 186.

188. See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, LES FORCES IMAGINANTES DU DROIT (III): LA
REFONDATION DES PouvoiRs 7 (2007).
189. In the first three months following the Lipietz Decision, the attorney for the
Lipietz plaintiffs estimated that about 1,000 new suits had been filed. See Rgmi Rouquette, Observations parallies au proc~s, Sept. 6, 2006, available at http://
www.acaccia.fr/observations-paralleles -aux-proces.html (last visited July 25, 2007);
see also Pillet, supra note 61, at 16 (post-Lipietz Decision lawyers who are handling
over 200 of those cases refer to numerous other lawyers also doing so).
190. See Pillet, supra note 61, at 16. Some consumer groups are permitted to initiate legal action on behalf of more than one individual. See Emmanu~le Luftala &
Veronica Magnier, French Legal Reform: What is at Stake if Class Actions are Introduced in France?, 73 DEF. CouNs. J. 301, 301-04 (2006).
191. See Mauro Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest Through the Courts:A
Comparativist'sContribution,25 BUFF. L. Rev. 643, 676 (1976) (explaining the origins
of the French legal order's resistance to "massification").
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duce a form of class action ("action collective") in consumer law
recently was rebuffed by Parliament, although a still more modest
one will be proposed shortly. 19 2 Moreover, since contingency fees are
considered contrary to public policy, the litigation costs faced by
plaintiffs constitute a burden that can be extreme, depending on the
plaintiffs particular financial situation.
Under the current French legal system, the absence of contingency fees favors wealthier plaintiffs in civil suits, whereas a partie
civile in a criminal law case in principle benefits from the state's investigative resources, both financial and professional. 193 The
problems are intensified by the lack of anything remotely resembling
U.S. civil discovery in France. 194 Not only are deeply rooted French
concerns for protecting privacy at odds with the notion of large-scale
discovery, but, in addition, the roles of lawyers in the United States
and France also are very different. French prosecutors, as members
of the judiciary, not the bar, traditionally hone their skills in unearthing the facts during the investigative phase of the trial process.
Lawyers traditionally play a more passive role in the French system.
Consequently, it is a rare French attorney who could equal the investigative know-how and initiative of a French prosecutor in identifying
195
relevant information.
192. President Chirac introduced the law. See Jean-Louis Dewost & Jules-Marc
Braudel, Les recours collectifs, 6tude compare, 226 PETITES AFFICHES DE LA LOI 3
(Nov. 13, 2006). On its rejection by Parliament, see Thomas Bronnec, Consommation.
Le gouvernement renonce & la class action, in L'ExPRESs (Jan. 30, 2007), availableat
http://www.lexpress.fr/info/quotidien/actyu.asp?id=8694. President Sarkozy's Minister of the Economy and Secretary of State for Consumers and Tourism are drafting
new "group action" ("action de groupe et la franqaise") legislation. See Bertille OsseyWoisard, La "class-action" et la frangaise fait son grand retour, YAHOO FRANCE FiNANCE (July 12, 2007), available at http://fr.biz.yahoo.com/12072007/202/la-class-action-la-francaise-fait-son-grand-retour.html (last visited July 25, 2007). Given that
President Sarkozy's politicial party, the UMP, holds a majority of seats in the National Assembly, it seems likely that the legislation will pass. For the composition of
the National Assembly since the June, 2007 elections, see Elections lgislatives 2007.
Une victoire de la droite moins large que prdvue, FRANCE 2.FR (June 18, 2007), available at http://elections.france2.fr/legislatives/2007/une/31993179-fr.php (last visited
July 25, 2007).
193. In the affaire Papon, Serge Klarsfeld, attorney for parties civiles, complained
that the prosecution in fact had left much of the investigation to him, contrary to
expectations, implying the government's continued mixed feelings about prosecuting
Papon, and that the prosecution was going to try Papon as a concession to public
sentiment. See Curran, supra note 23, at 92-93 and sources cited therein.
194. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR
REASONABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 140-79 (1996): RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442 (reporters'
note 1, 1987); Gary B. Born & Scott Hoing, Comity and the Lower Courts: Post-A6ro-

postale Applications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 INT'L LAwYER 393 (1990);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1676
(1998).
195. Professor Grande's excellent analysis of this difference in role, training, and
habit between lawyer and prosecutor in Italy also is germane to France. See Grande,
supra note 128, at 236-37.
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Thus, the entry into the French legal order of an action in tort
law to deal with matters previously dependent on the criminal law
system will require adaptive measures. In recent years, the French
legal system has been seeing an increase in the official powers of attorneys. 196 While formal changes need not produce substantive
change, they may signal the start of a process of adaptation. It also
may be, however, that the systemic difficulties attendant on accommodating the expansion of tort liability under Lipietz will help to persuade the Conseil d'tat to overturn the Administrative Court of
to the SNCF, as close to 2000 new
Toulouse's decision with19respect
7
cases wait in the wings.
The precedent already has been set, however, with respect to the
French government, since it did not appeal the lower court judgment.
An idea that crossed the Atlantic and the Channel, and that previously knocked on the doors of the French judiciary, now has gained
entry. 198 It is unlikely to turn back, although it may be stalled. Given
French law's rejection of American-style class action suits, the modesty of the currently contemplated proposal for a limited form of consumer "group action,"' 99 as well as the functions fulfilled by French
criminal trials that non-criminal tort trials can not equal, 20 0 the
French legal system faces significant challenges. These challenges illustrated by the Lipietz case are characteristic of globalization: how
to identify needed innovations which permit adaptation without undermining fundamental national legal values, as French litigants,
judges, legislators and scholars, like their counterparts world-wide,
continue the process of transnationalizing their national law.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article has examined how a confluence of influences and
concerns that typify legal transnationalization resulted in a French
court's departing from ideas generally deemed indespensable to justice in the French legal and political traditions, such that the result
was the first successful domestic tort action for a crime against hu196. A major reform of French criminal procedure went into effect in 2000. See Loi
2000-516, June 16, 2000, 138 J.O. p. 9038; this law was completed two years later by
Loi 2002-307, Mar. 1, 2002, 54 J.O. p. 4169.
197. As this article goes to press, the Conseil d'Etat did decide that the administrative courts lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs' suit against the SNCF. The decision of
Dec. 21, 2007 is available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/jurispd/index ac IdO743.shtml. Alain Lipietz, successor in interest to plaintiff Georges Lipietz,
has indicated his intention to appeal this decision to the European Court of Human
Rights and, if not vindicated there, then to join a U.S. class action suit. See Dgportation: le Conseil d'Etat refuse de se prononcer sur la culpabilitgde la Sncf, LE MONDE
(Dec. 21, 2007), available at http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3224,36992555,0.html.
198. See supra notes 133-40, and surrounding text.
199. See supra note 192.
200. See supra Part III.B.
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manity. Legal transnationalization was more than just a cause of the
distressed reaction in French society that followed the court's decision. It also was a major causal factor in the plaintiffs' bringing their
action, and in the court's validating it.
Legal transnationalization is occurring both openly2 0 1 and under
a cloak of silence. Assessing the changes within national legal systems in order to decide if they subvert fundamental values or if, on
the contrary, they meet societal needs and are compatible with core
values, requires teasing out the connections and assumptions of national legal mentalities. Especially where, as with the Lipietz case,
changes occur without acknowledgment, the inquiry must include
unarticulated concerns and considerations that affect national courts
as they transnationalize domestic law.
The distillation of law's transnationalizations requires keeping
an analytical finger on multiple and mutable pulses. In the twentyfirst century, which some believe will become the first "century in
which humanity... recognizes itself as [one] society,"20 2 the task will
be both daunting and vital. This article hopes to have provided a
glimpse into the laboratory of legal transnationalization that is affecting law in national courts, and thereby to have contributed to the
understanding of globalization's transformative effects on law in our
time and the alchemy by which it is occurring.

201. It has been suggested as a more subtle objective than world harmony that, as
globalization weakens nation-states, individual states increasingly become receptive
to acknowledging the law and legal norms of foreign states (but not of non-states),
because to do so strengthens the authoritative status of all states, including themselves. See Ralf Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of
Law, and the Challenge form Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. Rev. 1209, 1214

(2005).
202. See Allott, supra note 20, at 52 (emphasis omitted).
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